RATS AND MEN 353 



jective psychology can work together in peace and 

 harmony and with mutual advantage. 



It should be noted here that the radical behavior- 

 ist's aversion to the conventional treatment of con- 

 sciousness is directed in the main to the structural 

 psychologist's figment of a detached or detachable 

 psychic entity, whether static or dynamic, which 

 eludes scientific study. A thoroughgoing functional 

 view of the awareness process avoids much of this 

 difficulty by articulating the consciousness phenom- 

 enally with other vital processes without, however, 

 professing to clarify the mechanism of the relation- 

 ships of mind and body. All of the data of experience 

 can be approached empirically without insisting that 

 such an approach be preceded by a full understand- 

 ing of the underlying questions or an adjudication of 

 vexatious philosophical problems, as Rosenow (1923, 

 1925) and Carr (1925) have illustrated. 



Hunter (1924^, p. 28) seems to assume that a 

 functional psychologist must be philosophically an 

 interactionist, an imputation that some of us re- 

 pudiate vehemently. If this unjustifiable imputation 

 is eliminated from Hunter's discussion, then the be- 

 haviorists and the introspective psychologists of the 

 functional school may find a common meeting place 

 for their very diverse activities, except for one addi- 

 tional feature. Speaking for myself, at least, I am un- 

 able to admit that the only observable (or experi- 

 enced) feature of conscious behavior which distin- 



