454 NATURAL SCIENCE. august. 



In truth, Professor Lloyd Morgan is too good a psychologist 

 wholly to reject them ; but he has not quite the courage of his convic- 

 tions, and he hesitates to trust his full weight upon a bridge the 

 soundness of which he professes not to doubt, but which still, to his 

 mind, seems too shadowy to be solid. He fears that confusion will 

 result. Professor Pearson shows that the danger of obtruding idea- 

 listic results, in themselves true and valuable, into the conclusions of 

 the several sciences is an imaginary danger, but that harm has already 

 come about through the neglect of them. 



We may grant that the analysis of the nature of experience is on 

 one plane of investigation, and molecular physics on another, but by 

 shutting our eyes to the relation between them we (even now) run 

 some risk of framing a theory of Physics the language of which may 

 prove to be incompatible with our theory of Thought. 



In his discussion of the various problems raised by Professor 

 Pearson's book, Professor Lloyd Morgan begins with that of the 

 " external object " and the nature of " reality." 



Here, at any rate, by his own confession in "■ Animal Life and 

 Intelligence," it would seem that the reviewer is in substantial agree- 

 ment with his author ; but he is strangely diffident. Often he seems 

 to say, " I know that this is all true, but let us make believe that it 

 is not." 



Concerning " object and eject," Professor Lloyd Morgan, by a 

 strange oversight, has somewhat missed the point in dispute. The 

 question is not, as he supposes, as to whether or no some physical 

 link is necessary to enable one mind to appreciate the thoughts of 

 another. It is whether or no, by any imaginable means, the thoughts 

 of A. could become something more than matter of inference, and in 

 short be directly an object in the consciousness of B. 



Passing over the chapter on " Scientific Law " (perhaps the 

 most practically important in the book), and those on Cause and 

 Effect, and on Probability, Professor Lloyd Morgan deals next with 

 the subject of Space and Time. There can be no doubt that the 

 doctrine as to the nature of space and time which is associated with 

 the name of Kant is the most important positive addition which has 

 been made to the idealistic theory of human knowledge since the 

 days of Bishop Berkeley ; and it is one of the noteworthy features 

 of the "Grammar of Science" that here, perhaps for the first time 

 in the writings of English men of science, we find at once a full 

 recognition of the general truth of Kant's doctrine, a short but clear 

 exposition of it, and, in subsequent chapters, an explicit application 

 of it to the problems of Matter and Motion. 



Now, on this view of Space and Time there is much to be said. 

 Supposing it to hold its ground as a truth of philosophy, and to 

 acquire the place which it deserves in any complete account of human 

 psychology, there is still room for debate as to the best mode of 

 stating it, both for general purposes, and especially for the more 



