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of 1792 and, nearly eighty years later, in 1870, at the time of the 

 Franco-Prussian war, concealed the maneuvers of 4he Germans 

 before their crushing defeat of the French in the battle of Sedan. 

 To the westward the forest of Orleans is said to have given the 

 French the opportunity of rallying for their final stand in 1871 ; 

 while to the eastward the forest of Soigncs, by the shelter which 

 it offered to Wellington's forces, contributed to the defeat of 

 Napoleon at Waterloo. 



That the French government itself recognizes the lorests as 

 a means of defense is shown by a provision in the Code For- 

 estier, adopted in 1829 and still the forest law of the land, that 

 private owners can be prevented by the government from clearing 

 away forests at the frontier wherever these are deemed necessary 

 for defensive purposes. There can be no qviestion that they are 

 in fact a decided advantage to the army having possession of 

 them. First of all they offer a serious obstacle to the advance 

 of the enemy. Troops cannot march nor can artillery trains be 

 transported rapidly through dense woods, particularly when it is 

 possible to block the few roads leading through them by fallen 

 trees. In Alsace, so I was informed by an eye-witness, the first 

 step taken by the Germans after the declaration of war was to 

 barricade every road as effectively as possible in this way. Pre- 

 sumably the French did the same thing in their own country 

 wherever they were forced to retreat. That the blockades estab- 

 lished in this way were effective in checking the advance and 

 wasting the strength of the enemy can hardly be questioned. 



Furthermore, the forest forms an excellent shelter from which 

 an army can fire upon an advancing" enemy, while itself remaining 

 in comparative security. It is easy to imagine an infantry or a 

 cavalry charge across an open plain against an opposing army 

 entrenched on the edge of a forest being repulsed with tremen- 

 dous loss. On the other hand, there would be situations, partic- 

 ularly in level country, where the forest would present a serious 

 obstacle to artillery fire, and considerable areas have probably 

 already been cut over, in this as in other wars, to afford a clearer 

 field and wider range for the batteries. 



The value of a wooded cover in making fortifications must 

 also not be overlooked. A correspondent with the German army 

 in describing the fortifications about Metz has stated that they 

 were so skilfully concealed by woods and blended with the hill- 

 sides that nothing out of the ordinary was apparent. This is in 

 striking contrast to the forts at Liege, which, being unprotected 

 in this way, stood out so boldly against the sky line as fairly to 

 invite bombardment. The correspondent further stated that in 

 one particular battery which he visited overlooking the River 

 Meuse, the guns were placed behind a screen of thickly-branching 

 trees with the muzzles pointing to round openings in this leafy 

 roof. Even the gun carriages and tents were screened with 

 branches, while a hedge of boughs was constructed around the 



