Carleton.] 134 [February. 



thought that the determination of the mind could not of itself move 

 a leg or an arm, without the concurrent agency of the "Will, making 

 two causes necessary to produce one eifect, contrary to all the known 

 laws of nature, wherein many effects are produced from a single 

 cause. The fall of bodies, the motion of fluids, and the fluxes of the 

 tides come of gravitation alone. Heat warms our blood, cooks our food, 

 melts brass, expands the air, raises clouds, reanimates plants, clothes 

 them with leaves, and the earth with verdure. The atmosphere is 

 the vehicle of sound and respiration, causes twilight, morning, and 

 evening, and scatters decaying substances upon the winds. Sir 

 Isaac Newton has said : " More causes of natural things are not to be 

 admitted than are necessary to explain the phenomena; for nature 

 is simple, and does nothing in vain." While the Necessarians re- 

 quire two causes to one eifect, the Arminians require only one Will 

 that acts of itself. The mind, by its own energy, is the real cause 

 of action ; there is no such intermediate agent as the Will. If phi- 

 losophers cannot understand how the mind can be the cause of action, 

 how can they conceive the Will to be the cause ? much less can they 

 conceive the double agency of the Will, first to move itself, and then 

 to move the man. That the mind is the immediate cause of action, 

 is a fact of every man's own experience ; for if actuated by any other 

 cause, he would know it as he knows he hears with his ears, and sees 

 with his eyes. 



If metaphysicians earnestly seek the truth, they must condescend 

 to men of low estate, who obey the teachings of simple nature un- 

 sophisticated by the speculations of philosophy. The most illiterate 

 mechanic possesses within himself all that can be known of the 

 human mind. 



Ask a ploughman why he eats and drinks, he will reply, "To 

 satisfy hunger and thirst." His answer is just and complete. Put 

 the same question to a philosopher. He too will reply, " To satisfy 

 hunger and thirst." But the ploughman acts directly under the 

 impulse of his wants; while the philo.sopher's motive must first move 

 the Will to move the man before he can eat or drink. The plough- 

 man is conscious that his desire is the sole motive power. He knows 

 of no such agent within him as the Will; whereas, the philosopher's 

 desire cannot move him unless through the circuit of his Will. 



According to the theory of the Necessarians, when a man walks a 

 mile, he must repeat the operation of motive, volition, action, seven- 

 teen hundred and sixty times; motive, volition, action, the right 

 foot, motive, volition, action, the left foot; and whatever else he may 



