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These are a few of the ahnost numberless instances that might be 

 adduced, illustrative of an habitual departure from sound principles 

 of induction in the search after truth ; but they are sufficient to show 

 the great evil of this error, not only in relation to opinion, but in its 

 effects upon the well-being of mankind. 



We are peculiarly prone to it in this country, perhaps in conse- 

 quence of the habit we have acquired, mentally as well as physi- 

 cally, of hastening onward impatiently to our ends, and, consequently, 

 of recklessly overleaping or pushing aside considerations, which are 

 nevertheless, in general, essential to a safe and satisftictory issue. It 

 is, therefore, desirable to raise a conservative voice against this over- 

 eagerness, and strive as much as may be to restrain it within safe 

 limits. 



There are three prominent modes in which partial or insufficient 

 experiment or observation may lead into error. 



In the first place, the fact, though in itself true, may not have 

 been sufficiently studied in its various relations, or sufficiently com- 

 pared with other known facts, which might invalidate the conclusions, 

 hastily drawn from it when viewed isolatedly. Of this we have an 

 example in the inference already referred to, as to the non-nutritive 

 and heat-generating qualities of starch, employed as an article of 

 diet; the attention of the observer having been confined to the 

 results of a few partial experiments, and quite turned away from that 

 grand experiment in the course of constant performance by millions 

 of our race. 



Secondly, the seeming fact may prove, on close investigation, not 

 to be a fact at all, but a misunderstood result of inaccurate experi- 

 ment; as in the production of organized beings through electric 

 influence, out of inorganic matter; the truth being that sufficient 

 care had not been taken to exclude living germs from the field of 

 experiment. 



Thirdly, the observed fact may lead to erroneous conclusions from 

 want of attention to that general principle in nature, through which 

 all objects of human thought or notice, of whatever kind, which may 

 be associated together by any relation whatever, have a tendency to 

 an irregular instead of equable distribution, clustering more or less 

 at one time or place, and deficient in another; so that, when objects 

 are diffused with perfect equability, they are known at once, as a 

 general rule, to owe this condition to art. An ignorance or forget- 

 fulness of this great principle has been the source of innumerable fal- 

 lacies, often highly injurious in their influence. Such fallacies are 



