THE RELATION OF i'.ODV AXU MINI). 281 



of its material antecedents, and in no sense affected by such 

 mental states as desire or volition. But. as an}' machine does 

 its work, sparks may fl)' ont, or an engine may whistle, and there 

 are regnlar rhythmical pulsations of sound, things which result 

 from the working of the machine, but which are ([uite unim- 

 portant and irrelevant by-products of its action, and that is the 

 position which this theory assigns to all mental processes ; they 

 are merely effects of bodily processes, and imimportant casual 

 effects into the bargain. The only criticism that we need pass 

 here i> that, however much one may wish to disparage the work 

 of the mind, we cannot disguise the fact that it is at any rate 

 different in kind from that of the body — lower and less important 

 if }"0U like, bitt at any rate belonging to a different level or order 

 of things. The fact makes the illustrations I have given qtiite 

 futile. The whistling and clanking and throbbing of an engine 

 are on the same level as the more important movements of its 

 pistons and wheels : Ijut desire, thought, and volition are not on 

 the same level as the afferent or motor discharges of the nerves. 

 There is not sufficient common quality to enable us intelligently 

 to call the one effects of tlie other. We can say that the two 

 processes go on together, but not that the mental process is the 

 product, however casual, of the bodily process. In other words. 

 we are forced bacl< to ])arallelism, which at any rate recognises 

 that Ijrain processes cannot be said to cause mental states. 



And we seem to be brtiught lo the same pass if we take the 

 opposite view to epi-phenomenonalism, and regard consciousness 

 or conscious states as the sole reality, and the bodily states as a 

 delusive appearance, as a sort of shadow thrown b\ the mind. 

 According to '* psychical monism," everything is soul or soul- 

 stuff ; but one sottl can only manifest itself to another in material 

 bodily form: body is the unreal appearance of soul. i'.ut it is 

 difficult to tinderstand why even this unreal a])pearance should 

 exist: if soul is everything, why in the world should it a|)pear 

 as bod\'? Why shotild not soul act directly on soul, as there 

 are indications of its doing in cases of teleoathy? If the body 

 is real, it i^ ol)vious that soul can onlv reveal itself to soul 

 through l)0(lil\- action and ap])earance. But if bod\' does not 

 exist. Avh}- should soul insist on masqtieraduig in bodih' frjrm? 

 Thi'; =ecms to be ns awkward a question for ])svchical monists 

 as it is for Mrs. Tuldy and the Christian .'scientists. It seems 

 just as impossible to regard body as a shadow cast by soul, as it 

 is to regard soul as a phosphorescence cast b\- body. Neither 

 soul nor body can be reduced to the same order as the other, 

 ex])lained in terms of the other, and made the ghost or the bond- 

 slave I if the other. 



L'nless. then, we retmm to parallelism, and sa\- that tlie two 

 orders exist side by side without touching or influencing each 

 other, we must proceed to some theory of their mutual inter- 

 actioTi. And. bv talking of interaction, we allow that both mind 



