2^4 Till: RliLATlON OF JJUDV ASiJ MJ \1). 



intelligible the fact of interaction, which remains a problem or 

 an impossibility on strongly dualistic theories. 



Dn the one hand, mind and body are for ever distinct, they 

 cannot be identiticd. nor can either be sacrificed to the other — 

 made a shadow or a spark casually effected by the other; their 

 distinctness, their interactions, their occasional warfare, is the 

 source of all progress in science and morals. 



On the other hand, though distinct, they are not aliens. It 

 is not true that the one is absolutely spiritual and the other 

 entirely material. If that were so, there could never be any 

 interactions, but only juxta])ositir)n of the one with the other, 

 and perha])s the annihilation of one by the other. 



ijut as a matter of fact, througli their constant interfu>ioii 

 with each other, the mind has become materialised and the 

 nervous system mentalised. The mind is just the purposive 

 whole controlling the parts ; it has al\va)s been limited to the use 

 of those parts; it works piecemeal and in jerks, not in timeless 

 contemplation, just because successive nerve stimuli and nerve 

 reaction are the instruments it uses ; its ideas, again, on the most 

 spiritual themes are symbolical, are pictures or parables from 

 the material sphere, because it only has matter to work on. The 

 mind is free and purjiosive ; but its freedom is exercised upon,. 

 and its pur])oses are wrought out in a material medium. The 

 mind is just so far distinct from the body as the whole is from 

 the parts, as life is from the organism. The life is interfused 

 with ever}- ])art of the organism; it depends on the organism 

 on the one hand, and directs it on the other; and one aspect of 

 this organic life is what we call the mind. Thus we have, in 

 Bosanquet's words, a " moulding of the soul through its sur- 

 roundings — the modification thus brought to these surroundings., 

 and the results achieved through them." 



And on the other side, we must remember that the cerebral: 

 system is itself moulded and constituted by purposive action in 

 the past. It reacts to-day in a certain wa} . its motor discharges 

 are in a certain direction, because of the purposes to which it 

 has been made instrumental yesterday and the day before. It is 

 not a blind immaterial mechanism, but is charged with instincts, 

 habits and automatic arrangements, which are due to mind and' 

 make it akin to mind. It is a system of mentalised ])arts al)le 

 to interact with a necessarily materialised living mind. It is 

 a system of parts which imply and demand the whole, just as 

 the whole is limited to the use of the |)arts. .\nd I might just 

 suggest, in conclusion, that this conception of whole and parts 

 is fruitful beyond the sphere of the individual life. Just as in 

 that individual life the mind, as the whole, uses the body as the 

 parts, so in social life the individual freely surrenders himself 

 as a part to be used in the service of a larger whole. He and 

 other individuals together make up that whole, they are saturated 

 with the spirit of the whole, the\- wake up to their true nature 

 as members of the whole; and on the other hand, this social 



