A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE METHODS USED 

 FOR COUN ITNG IN ELECTIONS BY THE SINGLE 

 TRANSFERABLE VOTE. 



By John Brown, MT).. CM., F.R.C.S., L.R.C.S.E. 



SVN0PSI5. 



Introduction. 

 I. Object: To find the Members most preferred by al! the Voters. Ten 



general principles, a — j. 

 2- The Relative Majorit}-. 



3. The Absolute Majority and its Quota. 



4. The Single 'i'raiisterable Vote- 

 S- The Quota. 



6. The Necessity of counting as many First Choices as possible, and of 



treating alike each Grade of Choice on all Ballot Papers. 



7. Gregory's System of Correct Surplus Distribution. 



8. Humphreys & Pim's support of Heading 6. 



9. Hare's Quota necessary to carry No. 6 out. 



10. To carry out the Voter's Wishes, no Higher Choice must be passed 



over to make a Lower Choice efifectivc. 



11. How Droojj's Quota fails to carry out the Voter's Wishes. 



12. Members can be duly elected without getting the Quota. 



13. All Elections are over when the Member with the Fewest \'otes gets 



More than all the Outstanding Votes. 

 14 Requisites for a correct System of Counting. 



15. Recapitulation. 



16. Defects of the Senate Rules. 



17. Cape Hospital P>oard Election, 1915, under Senate Rules, and under 



Suggested Rules. Comparison of results. 



18. Illustration of a Displacement. Temporary Restdt Sheet. 



19. Final Result Sheet under Suggested Rules. 



30. Same Flection under Senate Rules, when every Transferred Vote is 

 transferred in part or whole as a Lower Grade Vote to another 

 Candidate than one marked on the same P>allot Paper to whom 

 it is counted under tiic Suggested Rules, on a higher grade vote. 



21. Demonstrated Results from using Droop's Quota in allotting the \'otes. 



Introduction. — lliis i)a])er i.s written to flemonstratc that the 

 rules by which the votes are counted in all our Senate elections. 

 and in all numicipal elections in the Transvaal, do not secure the 

 objects sought by Andrae Hare and John Stuart Mill when they 

 advocated the use of the siufj^le transferable vote in Parliamentary 

 elections, nor do they use the means they proposed. 



These objects were, firstly, that every voter's vote should 

 be luade effective for the election of the member he most pre- 

 ferred, as far as ])ossible ; and secondly, that each luember 

 should be elected by, and so represent, the largest possible equal 

 number of voters ^ 



That ntimber was — , — large N divided by small ;/. where 



n 

 large N is the number of voters and small ;/ the number 

 of members, and it divides the whole electorate into the n largest 

 possible equal sections : and by the use of the transferable vote 

 it enables every voter who marks his preferences on his ballot 

 paper to the necessary extent to make sure that his vote, like 

 every other voter's vote, will help e(|ually in the election of the 

 members. 



