66o MKTHdDS FOR COUNTING IN ELECTIONS. 



(i) Where the preferences of the voter are marked to 

 enahle his vote to be used, no vote of a grade lower 

 than that at which the election can be finished shonld 

 be used. 

 (/') To use a lower choice on a ballot paper than the highest 

 that can be made efifective is to fail to carry out the 

 voter's wishes and directions. 

 2. The Relative Majority. — The usual method of electing 

 town councillors or members of representative bodies in Eng- 

 lish-speaking communities is by the single non-transferable vote 

 in wards or constituencies returning one or more councillors 

 or members, who are elected by •' a relative majority." In this 

 method the quota, or number of votes sufficient to secure elec- 

 tion, is a variable (|uantity in every election. It is one more 

 than the number of votes obtained by the highest unsuccessful 

 candidate. In almost every case the majority of the voters do 

 not give an elTective vote — that is, a vote that actually helps 

 to elect the member. The votes made effective in this relative 

 majority method are the very smallest number it is possible to 

 use. 



Where there are two candidates for one seat, as soon as 

 the member secures a majority of .one vote, all the additional 

 surplus votes he receives do not help his election, are not effec- 

 tive votes. They are, so far as electing the member is con- 

 cerned, as non-effective as are all the votes tliat the defeated 

 candidate obtains. Thus, in every case where a majority of 

 more than one is obtained, the member is actually elected by a 

 minorit}^ of the voters. If A, the member, gets a large 

 majority, say 68 votes, and the defeated candidate, B, gets only 

 17 votes, the number of effective votes thait actually elect the 

 member is t<S, and 50 of his votes are non-effective, along with 

 the 17 votes his opponent got. Sixty-seven of the 85 vo<tes are 

 non-effective. Where several members have to be elected, and 

 there are man) candidates, the ]M-oportionate number of non- 

 eft'edtive votes is often vcrv much larger. 



3. Tile AlTSoliite Majority, a;.v/ its Quota. — This unsatisfac- 

 tory^ condition is remedied, to a certain extent, in most European 

 countries bv adopting the Continental method of " the absolute 

 majority system of election." In this system, where several 

 members have to be chosen, second ballots are held for the elec- 

 tion of those candidates, who at the original election do not 

 secure the necessary number of votes. Thus the voters get 

 another choice at a second election. This is a more satisfactory 

 result, and a great improvement on that given by " the relative 

 majority " method. 



Yet here, too, a considerable number of the votes given are 

 non-effective, especially when few members have to be elected. 

 If one member has to be chosen, as in the case of the British 

 Parliament, one more than one-half of the voters give effective 

 votes, one less than one-half of the votes are non-eff'ective. 

 Where two members are to be elected, each must get one more 



