THE REAL OBJECT OF NATURAL SCIENCE. 

 By Norman Mudd, M.A. 



[Abstract.] 



The formulation of some general account of scientific know- 

 ledge which can be subscribed t(i by all scientists, which can be 

 comprehended by the scientific layman, and which shall enable 

 him to understand the one or two things he really requires to 

 know about science, is one of the most urgent duties of modern 

 scientists, and one of the most present pul)lic needs. What is 

 wanted is some such account of scientific knowledge as shall 

 make comprehensible to the scientific layman what is the philoso- 

 phic status of science, in order that he may have some means 

 of judging what importance to attach to it in his general thinking. 

 The object of this paper is to clear some of the ground as a 

 necessary preliminary to the construction of such a general 

 statement. 



In spite of much misuse, the term " science " and "scientific" 

 have (|uite definite meanings when used by careful writers, mean- 

 ings which may be. summarised in the following definition : " By 

 science we mean a body of knowledge and assertion constructed 

 from past experience by induction, and capable of being tested 

 by observation and experiment." The suggestions which I shall 

 put ftjrward in this paper are concerned with science as delimited 

 by this definition. 



Now if we start with this definition of science, it seems to 

 me that whatever the actual contents of science may be at any 

 time, the following universal princij^les must hold: — 



1. Scientific assertions are all. in logical intention, condi- 

 tional promises, which, when translated out of their technical 

 language, are of the form: " If you do so and so, you will find 

 so and so — i.e., you will see. hear, taste, smell, or what not. some 

 specified sensible quality." Scientific knowledge is the knowledge 

 of what these promises should be, and of the grounds on which 

 they are made. 



2. Scientific assertions possess, therefore, that sort of cer- 

 tainty which always attaches to promises, i.e., save at certain 

 instants, when their truth or falsity may be known with a cer- 

 tainty that passes all doubt, they .possess no certainty and no final- 

 ity. They are merely waiting to be tested. 



3. Scientific assertions are limited, with absolute strictness 

 as regards their reference, to things which can be perceived by 

 the senses. 



The first of these principles, that all scientific assertions are 

 really conditional promises of things to be perceived, is to my 

 mind quite the most fundamental fact about science. To con- 

 ceive science in this way as a sort of empirical prophecy, makes 

 clear, without the need of formal demonstration, such matters 



