OBJECT OF NATURAL SCIENCE. 721 



contemplate are metaphysical objects which lie beyond the world 

 of our possible acquaintance and inspection. 



Let us suppose, for instance, that we are ordinary sensitive 

 and human people, and are deeply revolted at the idea of dogs 

 iDeing tortured for our profit, whether by vivisectors or others. 

 Now the intellectual foundation of our attitude is the quite meta- 

 physical belief that dogs do feel pain. It is a belief that cannot 

 be verified or tested, it is a belief which can be, and has been, 

 denied l\v various philosophers on various grounds. The pain, 

 if it exists, transcends completely our possible acquaintance and 

 inspection. And if the assertion that dogs feel pain is made, it 

 is made as an act of faith. Now it is this assertion which touches 

 so nearlv our passions, and not any recognition of the fact that 

 the assertion works in various ways. The assertion does work, 

 of course, in various pragmatic ways, and discussion about the 

 truth of the assertion is usually merely a discussion of how it 

 works. Thus, all the dog's l)eha\i(>ur suggests it, any religious 

 theorv suggests and asserts it. any theory of evolution suggests 

 it, scores of fine poems and moving stories would be unintelli- 

 gible without it. The assertion does, therefore, most emphatically 

 work, and the recognition of this is important, and gives mental 

 ease and intellectual backing in our belief. But any such facts of 

 w^orking are utterly alien from our intention when we make the 

 simple assertion : " Dogs feel pain." The question as to whether 

 the doctrine zvorks is one that mav lea\e us troubled, dissatisfied. 

 intellectually doubtful indeed. But the question as to whether 

 the doctrine is true, i.e., as to whether dogs do feel pain, is one 

 about which our passions are moved in an altogether diiierent 

 way. 



The inadequacy of the ])ragmatic theorv of truth is best seen, 

 therefore, in the case of doctrines about which we are easily 

 moved. It is necessarv to be ])assionatelv interested in a doctrine 

 in order that the utter difterence between what we mean by 

 its truth, and what the ])ragmatists assert we mean, may appeal 

 to us with full force. If the dogma of the existence of God is 

 for us merely an academic intellectual (|uestion. it is compara- 

 tivelv easv for a sophist to ccjnxincc himself, and us, that its 

 truth means and consists in the fact tliat it works, the fact, for 

 instance, that it comforts people and gives them strength, and 

 allows them to take moral holidays. But it is not ])ossible to 

 talk in this manner to a passionate Ijeliever. the peace of whose 

 soul is bound up in the dogma. The same is true of any meta- 

 physical assertion whatever. It is metaphysical or non-scientific, 

 because its reference transcends in sf)me way the world of possi- 

 ble acquaintance and inspection, and for anyone to whom it is 

 in itself a i:)assionate and vital concern, the pragmatic suggestion 

 is wholly inadequate. 



