l8 BRAIN MECHANISMS AND LEARNING 



when I feel he is ahnost a dozen times my superior, even in the master art 

 of wrigghng, I feel aggrieved. If he had trained himself to observe more, 

 even at the expense, by the law of balancement, of some loss of thinking 

 power, he would have been a wonderful man.' 



In a letter to E. Ray Lankester in 1870, Darwni's regard reached a high 

 point: 'It has pleased me to see how thoroughly you appreciate (and I do 

 not think this is general with men of science) H. Spencer; I suspect that 

 hereafter he will be looked at as by far the greatest living philosopher in 

 England; perhaps equal to any that have lived.' Darwin's regard was also 

 expressed in a note to Spencer himself at this time (1872): 'Dear Spencer 

 — I daresay you will think me a foolish fellow but I cannot resist the wish 

 to express my unbounded admiration for your article. Everyone with eyes 

 to see and ears to hear (the number, I fear, are not many) ought to bow 

 their knee to you, and I for one do.' 



In a letter to Fiske, in 1874, reaction had set in: 'With the exception of 

 special points, I did not even understand H. Spencer's general doctrine; 

 for his style is too hard work for me. This may be very narrow minded; 

 but the result is that such parts of H. Spencer as I have read with care 

 impressed my mind with the idea of his inexhaustible wealth of suggestion, 

 but never convinced me.' 



In a fmal judgment, in his Aiitohi(\^rapliy (1958), Darwin commented: 

 'Herbert Spencer's conversation seemed to mc very interesting but I did 

 not like him particularly and did not feel that I could easily become 

 intimate with him. I think he was extremely egotistical. After reading any 

 of Spencer's books, I generally feel enthusiastic admiration for his trans- 

 cendent talents and have often wondered whether in the distant future he 

 would rank with such great men as Descartes, Leibniz, etc., about whom, 

 however, I know very little. Nevertheless, I am not conscious of having 

 profited in my own work by Spencer's writings. His deductive manner of 

 treating every subject is wholly opposed to my frame of mind. His 

 conclusions never convince me: and over and over again I have said to 

 myself after reading one of his discussions, "Here would be a fine subject 

 for half a dozen year's work." His fundamental generalizations (which 

 have been compared in importance by some persons with Newton s 

 Laws !) — which I daresay may be very valuable under a philosophical 

 point of view — are of such a nature that they do not seem to me to be of 

 any strictly scientific use. They partake more of the nature of definitions 

 than of laws of nature. They do not aid one in predicting what will 

 happen in any particular case. Anyhow, they have not been of any use to 

 me.' 



