February 25. 19)8 



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Pertinent Legal Findings 



Qiirrlcx on qucniionn arl.iiiip on anv points invohhu; Ihr law as it is applicil to lumhcrinp and allied industries iMl he given proper expert 

 attention thrnuijli this dei'iartmcni if submitted to II.\1![>\vipi)I) Kixijeio. Tliere uilt lie no eharye lor sueli service, but llAunwooo KiccoiiD 

 '•cscrvvs tliv ri<ilit to publisli questions and answers witliout desiynatiny names or locatio7i of inijuirics unless apeciflcally rciiueatcd not to do so. 



Lawful Trade Union Practices 



A trade uuioii of carpenters or woodworkers may lawfully forbid 



its members from working in an open shop planing mill with non- 

 union men, without becoming liable to the operator of the mill as 

 for declaring an unlawful boycott, although a general boycott 

 declared with malicious intent to effect an unlawful purpose is 

 actionable. And unionists, to promote the legitimate objects of 

 organized labor, may agree among themselves not to work upon 

 non-6niou made materials. But when a trade union calls upon 

 the public generally to discontinue use of a particular manufac- 

 turer's materials, and seeks to prevent all persons from dealing 

 with him, there is an actionable interference with his business. 

 Trespassing Upon Timber 



One who willfully trespasses upon private timber acquires no title 

 to logs cut by him, and hence can convey no title to a third person 

 howsoever innocent the third person may be of any wrongful intent. 

 And where the owner of such timber traces it through the hands 

 of a willful trespasser into products manufactured from the logs, 

 he is entitled to claim the value of such products, not being 

 restricted to the value of the logs. In other words, a trespasser 

 or one claiming directly under him, when caught with the logs in 

 coverted form is not entitled to an allowance on account of labor 

 or expense involved in such conversion. And within these prin- 

 ciples one is a "willful trespasser" if he goes upon land and cuts 

 timber on the strength of some person's statement that he is the 

 owner of the timber and authorized to grant the right to cut it, 

 without requiring such person to exhibit his title. 

 Injuries Caused by Simple Tools 



In affirming a judgment dismissing a suit brought by a lumber 

 company's employe to recover damages caused by a defective 

 hatchet furnished him for use in his work, the Arkansas supreme 

 court recently said in the case of Arnold vs. Doniphan Lumber 

 Company, 198 Southwestern Reporter, 117: 



.\n innumerable number of cases define the duty of the master in fur- 

 nishing the servant safe tools with which to work, and the duty of inspect- 

 ing those tools, but there are circumstances under which the master owes 

 the servant no such duty. He does not owe this duty where the tool fur- 

 nished is one which requires no special skill or training for its safe use, 

 and when the defect, if any, is as obvious to the servant as it is to the 

 master, or when the defect arises from the use of the tool and the servant 

 would naturally be the first person to discover the existence of the defect. 

 The concurrence of these conditions gives rise to what is called the 

 "simple tool" doctrine, which is another way of saying that the master 

 must inspect and instruct when the circumstances of the employment are 

 such that reasonable care and prudence would suggest that this be done, 

 but that he owes no such duty when the necessity therefor is not reason- 

 ably apparent. 



Title to Lumber in Transit 



The right of the holder of a bill of lading to reclaim possession 

 of lumber shipped under it was involved in the late case of Mer- 

 chants' & Manufacturers' Bank of Ellisville, Miss., against Philip 

 J. Toomer Lumber Company, 76 Southern Reporter, 565, decided 

 by the Mississippi supreme court. 



The W. M. Carter Lumber Company received an order for a 

 carload of lumber to be shipped to the Ganahl Lumber Company 

 and apparently made shipment under a straight bill of lading. 

 The invoice and bill of lading were assigned to plaintiff bank, 

 which sent the papers to the Ganahl Company, stating that they 

 belonged to the bank until the invoice price should be paid. While 

 the lumber was in transit, a creditor of the Ganahl Company at- 

 tached it, and the bank filed a claim for possession as against the 

 attaching creditor, because title had not passed to the Ganahl 

 Company. 



In upholding the bank 's right to possession, the supreme court 

 holds that ordinarily a shipment of lumber directly to a buyer 



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under a bill of lading naming him as consignee vests title in him 

 wlicn delivery is made by the seller to the carrying railway company 

 for transportation, bul that title does not pass where, as in this 

 case, the seller or his assignee signifies intention to retain title 

 until payment is made. 



Aspects of Timber Sales 



The written terms of a contract for a sale of standing timber 

 cannot be contradicted by either party showing that at the time 

 the contract was signed there existed some verbal agreement at 

 variance with such terms, although it is permissible to show a 

 verbal agreement for the purpose of explaining away ambiguity 

 existing in the writing. Where a contract for a sale of standing 

 timber reserved to the landowners the right to remove tanbark 

 during peeling seasons, the act of the purchasers of the timber in 

 felling the trees before expiration of those seasons and before 

 the landowners had peeled the bark was an actionable wrong, 

 giving the latter a valid damage claim. A sale of "merchantable 

 timber" conveys all such timber as is ordinarily used for sale or 

 manufacture in the particular locality, and is not limited to such 

 logs as will produce grades of lumber known and recognized as 

 merchantable among lumber manufacturers. Where timber is sold 

 on condition that it be cut and removed by the purchaser within 

 a stated time, all timber left standing after expiration of that 

 time reverts to the landowner, regardless of the fact that the buyer 

 may have made full payment to cover all timber. (Virginia supreme 

 court of appeals, M. C. MeCorkle & Son vs. Kincaid, 93 Southeast- 

 ern Reporter, 642.) 



Trespass Upon Standing Timber 



Under a sale of all hickory timber on a certain tract of land, 

 mesauring eight inches or more at the stump, and trees of other 

 kinds measuring twelve inches or- more, the buyer cannot avoid 

 liability for a statutory penalty for cutting trees under the agreed 

 dimension by showing that his employes were given general in- 

 structions to cut only such trees as should be of the agreed sizes; 

 the buyer in such case must exercise reasonable superintendence 

 over his employes to see that they do not sever trees reserved by 

 the seller. 



Return of Goods by Buyer 



Where a buyer of saws returned them to the seller by express, 

 seeking a cancellation of his contract of purchase, the burden was 

 on him to show that the seller actually received the saws back 

 and retained them; mere proof that the buyer sent them by freight 

 to the seller with transportation charges prepaid raises no presump- 

 tion that the seller received them. In such case, the railway com- 

 pany is to be regarded as the buyer's agent, and not the seller's, 

 for the purpose of returning the articles. (North Carolina supreme 

 court. Branch Saw Company vs. Bryant, 93 Southeastern Reporter, 

 839.) 



Duty to Warn Employe Ag'ainst Dangers 



In affirming judgment in favor of an employe who was injured 

 by collapse of the roof of a lumber shelter while he was engaged 

 in removing tin from the roof, caused by a defective support of 

 the roof, it is held by the North Carolina supreme court that the 

 injured man was bound to take notice of such dangers as were 

 plainly manifest, but that he was entitled to rely upon defendant 

 employer's assurance given him that the roof was safe for the 

 purposes of his work. The employer was bound to inform himself 

 concerning the safety of the place before giving such assuiiince. 

 In this case the defect consisted in the fact that the roof was sup- 

 ported by part of the tin being nailed to an adjoining building, 

 and the danger was not appti,rent to the employe, for he did not 

 know and his duties did not require him to know that there was 

 no supporting braces under the roof. 



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