May 25, lOlTi 



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Pertinent Legal Findings 



Employer's Liability for Defective Machinery 



An operator of :i woodworking machine cannot recover for injury 

 sustained on account of a defective condition of the machine unless 

 he shows what the defect was and that the employer was guilty of 

 carelessness in not discovering and repairing it. (Michigan supreme 

 court, Lvdman vs. De Haas, 151 Northwestern Reporter 71S.) 



Recovery of Lumber Sold to Insolvent Buyer 



When lumber has been clelivereil on credit under a contract of sale 

 on a misrei)resentation by tlie buyer that he was solvent, whereas 

 he was not, the seller, on discovering the fraud, may recover the 

 lumber not only from the buyer, but from any third person to whom 

 tlie purchaser may have transferred it, unless such third person bought 

 tlie lumber in good faith and for a valuable consideration. If the 

 lumber were transferred to cancel a pre-existing debt owing from the 

 buyer to the third person, the latter cannot be deemed to be an in- 

 nocent purchaser for value. (Pennsylvania supreme court, W. G. 

 Ward Lumber Company vs. American Lumber & Manufacturing 

 Company, 93 Atlantic Reporter 470.) 



, Duty to Warn Inexperienced Saw Operator 



A lumber company is lialile for injury to an inexperienced operator 

 of a circular saw, resulting from failure to warn him against the 

 unappreciated danger of boards jumping while being sawed. (Ver- 

 mont supreme court, Carleton vs. E. & T. Fairbanks & Co., 93 Atlantic 

 Reporter 462. 'i 



Authority to Promise Payment for Material 

 One who was in charge of building construction as agent of a 

 general contractor may be found to have had authority to promise 

 to pay for materials furnished a subcontractor, although such au- 

 thority was denied, where it appears that he was in general charge 

 of the work, buying and paying for material, hiring and paying 

 workmen, and completed the work after abandonment of it by sub- 

 contractors. (Isorth Carolina supreme court, Powell & Powell vs. 

 King Lumber Company, 84 Southeastern Reporter, 1032.) 



Accepting Delivery of Freight 

 After opening a ear for the purpose of unloading it, and resealing 

 it with a lock, to which he retained the key, a consignee of freight 

 «rill not be heard to deny that he accepted delivery, so far as con- 

 cerns the delivering railway company's liability for subsequent loss 

 of the freight by fire, not shown to have been caused by negligence 

 attributable to the railway company. (Nebraska supreme court, 

 McEntire vs. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacifle Railway Company, 152 

 Northwestern Reporter, .10.5.") 



Binding Quality of Signed Contract 

 A person who signs a written contract, after full opportunity to 

 read it, and without having been misled as to its contents through 

 ^raud of the other party, will not be permitted to avoid its effect 

 by denying knowledge of its terms when he signed the instrument. 

 (Kentucky court of appeals, L^nit^d Talking Machine Company vs. 

 Metcalf, 173 Southwestern Reporter, 357.) 



Sufficiency of Offer to Sell 



A manufacturer of lumber writes a wholesale dealer that he has 

 "about" 500,000 feet of lumber of certain grade on hand, for 

 which he ' ' wants ' ' a stated price f . o. b. the mill. Is the dealer 

 entitled to treat this as an offer to sell, and to convert the transac- 

 tion into a bind contract of sale by signifying his acceptance of the 

 terms? This most important legal question, involved every day in 

 the lumber world, is answered in the negative by a decision just 

 announced by the supreme court of Nebraska, in the case of Ne- 

 braska Seed Company vs. Harsh, 152 Northwestern Reporter, 310. 

 That court holds that the manufacturer 's letter must be regarded as 

 a mere invitation to the addressee to enter upon negotiations to buy 

 the lumber. The case before the court was one involving negotiations 



for a sale of seed, but the principles fit the case we have supposed 

 perfectly. 



The theory adopted by the court is that such a letter must be 

 deemed to be on the same plane as a general circular letter inviting 

 negotiations, especially where it does not offer to sell a definite 

 quantity. Under the reasoning of the supreme court, the manu- 

 facturer may have less or more than 500,000 feet of lumber on 

 hand, in the case supposed. If he has more, he is entitled to insist 

 on selling all, rather than keep the excess for which there may be 

 no satisfactory market. If he has less, he cannot be committed to 

 seU full 500,000 feet. 



The addressee of the letter must distinguish it as being either an 

 offer to sell or an invitation to negotiate, realizing that, if it is of 

 the latter character, it has probably been submitted to others and 

 is subject to contract of sale made with a third person before being 

 availed of by the particular addressee. 



Loss of Lumber in Railway Fire 



In a suit against a railway company for loss of lumber piled near 

 its right-of-way through fire in burning off the right-of-way, the 

 burden is on the company to show that the loss was not caused by 

 any careless act on its part, and not on the owner of the lumber to 

 affirmatively establish negligence. (North Carolina supreme court, 

 Stemmler vs. Randolph & Cnmberl.and Railwaj' Company, 85 South- 

 eastern Reporter, 21.) 



When Materialman Is Not Entitled to a Lien 

 One Clinton was awarded a contract to provide two flights of stairs 

 to be installed in a building, but his contract did not obligate him to 

 affix them to the building for which they were to be specially con- 

 structed. He sublet the work to plaintiff who manufactured the 

 stairs after obtaining the specifications therefor from the owner. 

 Under this state of facts, plaintiff afterwards brought suit to enforce 

 a lien against the building, but the Indiana appellate court decided 

 that there is no right of lien in such case, since the transaction 

 amounted to the furnishing of materials to a materialman, and the 

 Indiana lien law makes no provision for a lien in such ease. The 

 court holds that since Clinton was not to install the stairs, but merely 

 furnish them, he was a materialman, and not a contractor. Plaintiff 'a 

 contention, which was not upheld, was that the case was one of a sub- 

 contractor who built an essential part of the house by the use of 

 labor and materials, and furnished it on the premises for that par- 

 ticular improvement, under an employment by the contractor ( Clin- 

 ton) who had undertaken with the owner to furnish the necessajy 

 labor and materials, and produce a completed portion of the house 

 for use in its construction. (Rudolph Hegener Company vs. Frost, 

 108 Northeastern Reporter 16.) 



Assumption of Risk by Lumber Teamster 



A teamster experienced in handling lumber assumed the risk of 

 being injured through a defective condition of a chain used in bind- 

 ing a load, where he knew of that condition, and continued to use 

 the chain after complaining of its insufficiency. (Michigan supreme 

 court, Kelley vs. Davison, 151 Northwestern Reporter 671.) 



Authority of Representatives 



An agent of a lumber company engaged to buy lumber has no 

 implied authority to bind the company by agreeing to pay another 

 person a commission to assist in negotiating a purchase. It does not 

 appear that it is usual or necessary for such a representative to 

 employ at his principal's expense another person to assist him in the 

 discharge of his duties. (Texas court of civil appeals. Cummer Manu- 

 facturing Company vs. First National Bank, 173 Southwestern Re- 

 porter 536.) 



That stream of world's gold is now flowing this way again, and 

 quite a lot of it comes in return for a stream of golden grain that 

 is going from here to war-torn Europe. 



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