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Pertinent Legal Findings 



Invalid Restrictions Against Plant Locations 



All oriiiniiiii 1' i>t' :t ity inirp.irtiii;; tti lorlii.l roiistiintiim or 

 operation of adiiitionnl I'lnniiig mills, wiwiiiill.x, sash or tloor fiietorics, 

 furiiituro or rabiuet factories, or other woodworking eNtul)lishiii<^iits, 

 if planers, stickers or jointers are used, and run liy power, without 

 first obtaining a permit from the nninioiiml authorities, is uncon- 

 stitutional as milking nn unroiisoiiiiMe ilisi'riminntion between 

 .•stablishnieiits already in operation and those ilesirint; to after- 

 wards operate them. (California distrii't I'oiirt of appeal, ex parte 

 Kordoulis, 14S Taeili.- Keporter, SOO.) 



When Freight Rates Are Conflicting 

 It 11 railway company's publisheil tariffs disclose conflictinc 

 freight rules to cover a given shipment, a shipper is eutitleii to 

 the benefit of the lower rate. (New York suiireme <<inrt. appellate 

 term; Hreyfuss vs. Pennsylvania Company; |.">.'! New ^'ork .Snp- 

 i.l.ineiit. llfiti.) 



Damages for Buyer's Breach of Contract 

 \\ ricii MM owner of a lumber mill contracts to sell a ipiantity of 

 lumber to another, and the latter un.jnstifiedly breaks the contract 

 by refusing to accept tlelivery, the manufacturer's riuht to recover 

 the excess of the agreed price above the cost of complying with the 

 agreement, as to manufactured lumber, is not affected by the fact 

 that ho might keep his mill running at full capacity in filling 

 orders for other buyers. This statement is sustained by a recent 

 decision of the New York court of appeals handed down iu the 

 ease of Oswego Falls Pulp & Paper Company vs. Stecker Litho- 

 graphic Cnnipany, 1(19 Xortlieastcrn IJcporti'r, 92. 



Materialman's Interest in Contractor's Bond 

 A bond given by a building contractor to secure pcrforinaiu'o of 

 his contract, and obligating him to pay all claims for labor and 

 materials, will not be deemed to be broad enough to entitle a third 

 person, who furnishes lumber or other materials to the contractor, 

 to maintain a suit on the bond, unless the instrument clearly 

 manifests a purpose to permit such suit. (Texas court of civil 

 appeals, Waples Lumber Company vs. General Bonding & Casualty 

 Insurance Company, 17() Southwestern Keporter, (i.jl.) 



Seller's Right to Recover Fixtures 

 Defendant sold a merchant certain store fixtures, including show- 

 cases and counters, and they were delivered. Later the buyer 

 gave notice of a claim on account of delay in delivery and on 

 account of claimed defects in the fixtures, stating that they would 

 not be aci'epted, unless the claims should be allowed. Defendant 

 denied liability and insisted on payment of the agreed ])rice. Still 

 later, the buyer became bankrupt and ilefendant forcibly took 

 possession of the fixtures. Under these facts, the New York court 

 of appeals decided that the defendant was liable to the estate in 

 bankruptcy for the value of the fixtures, on the ground that, by 

 treating the transaction as an absolute sale before the buyer 

 became a bankrupt, right to reclaim tlie fixtures was lost. (Mur- 

 phy vs. .John Hofnian ('oni]>any. Iu9 Xorthcastern Reporter, 101.) 



No Delivery Without Acceptance 

 An important legal principle affecting contracts for purchase of 

 lumber and other commodities is recognizeil by the late decision of 

 the North Dakota supreme court to the effect that there can be 

 no "delivery" to the buyer, so as to render him liable for the 

 purchase price, by placing the property on his premises, if before 

 the property was shipped by the seller tlie buyer repudiated the 

 agreement to buy and jiersisted in his refusal to accept delivery. 

 (Hart-Parr Company vs. Finley, 153 Northwestern Reporter, 137.) 

 The decision accords the right of the buyer under an unperformed 

 contract of sale to repudiate it, subject merely to liability to the 

 seller for all damages sustained bj' the latter through the breach 

 of agreement. 



Corporation's Liability for Slander 

 Under a holding of the Michigan supreme cuurt a cor|>oratiou 

 is not liable for slander committed by one of its officers or employes 



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unless the company anthori/.ed or ratilicd the utterance. It makes 

 no difference that the slan<ler was committed in the performance 

 of the ollicer or employe's duties, as where one was orally accused 

 by a re|ireseutative of a compjiny of having stolen certain articles, 

 although it was the duty of the representative to recover lost or 

 stolen ])roperty belonging to the company. 



Reliability of Corporation's Directors 



The directors of a business corporation cannot be held personally 

 liable to the stockholders for loss in management of the com- 

 pany's affairs, unless the loss resulted from failun- to use good 

 faith or due care. But entrusting management of the business 

 to incompetent or inexperienced persons is such gross carelessness 

 as will subject the directors to liability to the stockholders for 

 consequential loss. (Alabama sujjreme court, King vs. Livingston 

 Manufacturing Cotn]iaiiy, fiM Southern Re])orler, H97.) 

 Injury Caused by Defect in Jointer 



In allirming the liability of an employer for injury to a work- 

 man caused by a defet't in a jointer which he was operating, the 

 Springfield, Mo., court of ajipeals liolds that an employe's act in 

 remaining at work at a ilefci'ti\e machine with knowledge of its 

 condition will not be deemed to be such contributory ni'gligcni'C 

 as will preclude him from recovering damages for resulting injury, 

 unless the danger is so obvious that a reasonably prudent person 

 would refuse to use the machine. On the other hand, the court 

 decides that an cmjdoyer is not required by law to furnish the 

 liest or safest appliances obtainable for a given class of work, and 

 is not to be charged with negligence toward his workmen merely 

 because a safer appliance might have been furnished. He dis- 

 charges his legal duty by furnishing reasonably safe appliances and 

 machinery. (Hosheit vs. Lusk, 176 Southwestern Reporter, 713.) 



Protection of Trade-Names 



It has long been wcll-settlcil law tliat no companj' engaged in 



the manufacture or sale of lumber, furniture, or other products, 

 can acquire an exclusive right to use words indicative of the 

 nature of the business, such as "lumber manufacturing company." 

 In a somewhat less strict sense it is also established law that the 

 name of the town in which comjjeting manufacturers do business 

 cannot be monopolized by either as i)art of a trade-name. How- 

 ever, in a recent decision, which seems to state the law applicable 

 in all the states, the Minnesota sujjreme court says: 



Where one manufacturer or dealer has ailopted and acquired the rl^ht to 

 use. as a trade-nanie. a conibiuatUm of words which indicates his place of 

 l)iisiness and also is deserlptivo of his product. If another, although engaged 

 in the same line of business in the same town, and having the right to 

 use the same words to indicate his location and the nature of bis busi- 

 ness, thereafter combines sucli words into a trade-name for himself 

 which is. in form, so nearly like that previously adopted hy his com- 

 petitor as to mislead the public, it constitutes unfair competition. While 

 his competitor cannot acquire the excinsive right to use the name of the 

 town in which both do business, nor the exclusive riglit to use the 

 descriptive words ordinarily used to indicate the nature of the l)usiness, 

 yet, if the one second in point of time disires to incorporate such words 

 in iiis own trade-name, lie must use tbein in such form or combine them 

 with other words in such manner that his trade-name will be fairly 

 distinguishable from that of his competitor. He will not be permitted to 

 simulate the prior trade-name to such an extent that purcha.sers will be 

 led to deal with him under the belief that they arc dealing with bis 

 competitor. 



Carrier's Duty to Furnish Cars 



A carrier's legal liability for f;iilure to furnish cars at a certain 

 time and place for shipment of lumber may arise from breach of 

 its general duty to the public to jiroviiie shipping facilities without 

 unjust discrimination, or it may arise from breach of a special 

 contract to provide cars for a particular shipment. The Reciprocal 

 Demurrage Act of Georgia is applicable only where the gist of a 

 shipper's claim is based on violation of the carrier's public duty, 

 irrespective of contract. When the gist of the claim is failure on 

 the part of the defendant railway company to comply with a 

 specific contract to furnish cars the act does not apply. (Georgia 

 court of appeals, Snellgrove & Bozeman vs. Georgia Northern 

 Railway Company, 85 Southeastern Keporter, 790.) 



