s.'ptciniHT 111. I'.n:.. 



Pertinent Legal Findings 



Queries on questions orisintj nn mni points inrolring the law as it is applied to lumherinff and allied industries will lie (jiven proper 

 expert attention through this itrp<irtment if submitted to Hardwood Record. There will he no charge for such service^ but Hardwood 

 Record reserves the right to publish questions and ansieers tvithuut designating names or location of inquiries unless specifically requested 

 not do do so. 



Damages for Breaking Logging Contracts 

 The damages recoveral)le for breach of a contract to sell and 

 deliver logs at a sawmill are to be measured by the difference 

 between the contract price and the greater price which the ag- 

 grieved party was required to pay for logs at the place where the 

 mill was located, or, if no logs were obtainable there, the price 

 at the nearest market, plus the cost of transportation, even though 

 that price would have been too high for profitable manufacture of 

 lumber. (Oregon supreme court, Williams vs. Pacific Surety Com- 

 pany, 149 Pacific Reporter, 524.) 



Injury to Loading Employee 



Defendant lumber company sold manufactured timbers and was 

 engaged in loading them on ears, the w'ork being done by plaintiff 

 and other employes. The foreman being temporarily absent in- 

 duced the timber inspector of the purchaser to act as foreman, 

 and plaintiff was in.iured by being struck by a timber which had 

 caught on a skidway while he was attempting to loosen it under 

 negligent orders given by the inspector. Held, that the lumber 

 company is liable for the accident on the theory that the in- 

 spector became temporarilj' its employe whose orders plaintiff was 

 bound to obey. (Springfield, Mo., court of appeals, Allen vs. 

 Quercus Lumber Company, 177 Southwestern Reporter, 753.) 



Damages for Seller's Default 

 The mere fact that the buyer under contract for a sale of lumber 

 requests delivery after expiration of the contract time for delivery 

 does not preclude him from recovering damages sustained on ac- 

 count of the delay. But where a seller failed to deliver within a 

 time specified, and thereafter stated when shipment would be com- 

 menced and completed, and offered the buyer the option of cancel- 

 ing the contract, and the buyer canceled it in part, there was, in 

 effect, a new contract fixing a new time for delivery, and the 

 buyer waived all claim up to that time for damages for delay. 

 (New York supreme court, appellate division; Bailey vs. Elm City 

 Lumber Company; 154 New York Supplement, 2S1.) 



Duty to Drivers of Horses 



When a lumlier company uses horses in the transportation of 

 lumber on trucks, the company is under legal duty to its drivers 

 to use a reasonable degree of care to provide safe animals, in order 

 to minimize the risk of injury to the drivers. As to the docility 

 of an animal, the employer is bound by what he knows, or in the 

 exercise of reasonable diligence, might know. So, where it appears 

 that the foreman of a lumber yard has had ample opportunity 

 to learn of vicious tendencies of a particular horse, the employer 

 will be held liable for injury to an employe arising from continued 

 use of the animal. (Oregon supreme court, Marks vs. Columbia 

 County Lumber Company, 149 Pacific Reporter, 1041.) 



Care Required of Sawmill Employes 



Although all employes must exercise a reasonable degree of care 

 in their work to avoid injury to themselves, the law does not 

 exact such great care of an inexperienced and youthful worker as 

 from a mature and experienced man, and in determining whether 

 the former has been guilty of negligence contributing to his own 

 Injury this difference must be observed. (United States circuit 

 court of appeals, ninth circuit; McCann vs. Benson Lumber Com- 

 pany, 223 Federal Reporter, 1.) 



Duty to Inspect Logging Chains 



The fact that a lumber company engaged in logging operations 

 has purchased chains from a reputable manufacturer does not 

 exonerate it from the duty of having them inspected by a com- 

 petent person, to ascertain their fitness for use, and the company 

 is liable for injury to an employe caused by negligent failure of 

 the employer to discover and remedy a defect in a chain. (Oregon 



supreme court, Evansen vs. Grande Ronde Lumber Company, 149 

 Pacific Reporter, 1033.) 



Liability for Fall of Lumber Pile 



Persons who are permitted to use a path through a lumber yard, 

 without being connected in any way with the owner's business, 

 are known in law as licensees on the premises. The nature of a 

 lumber company's duty to safeguard such persons against injury 

 is thus summed up in a late case where a company was sued for 

 injury caused by fall of a lumber pile: "The evidence wholly fails 

 to show that the lumber company negligently piled the lumber there 

 after it knew that the plaintiff was going near the dolly way, after 

 the path had been obstructed by the pile of cross-ties. And, unless 

 they did so pile it there after such known use, there would be no 

 liability whatsoever, because, being under the burden of accepting 

 the premises as she found them, plaintiff could not complain if 

 that condition was not a safe one and resulted in her injuries. 

 The owner was only under the duty of using ordinary care not 

 to cause willful injury to her, but was under no duty to guard her 

 against the consequences of negligence done before she began 

 using this passageway." (Texas court of civil appeals, Polk vs. 

 Wm. Cameron & Co., 177 Southwestern Reporter, 1178.) 



Points Affecting Lumber Sales 



An order transmitted from Pennsylvania to Vermont for lumber 

 to be shipped "at once" was sufticiently complied with on the 

 seller's part by shipment within two days, according to the holding 

 of the appellate term of the New York supreme court in the case 

 of Levy \g. John C. Dettra & Company, 154 New York Supplement, 

 176. Speaking on other phases of the case, the court says: 



The case turns on whether or not the contract was entire or severable. 

 The undisputed facts are that the lumber lay in two piles at West Ru- 

 pert, Vt. ; that defendant bought them on the same day for one price, 

 to be delivered together "shipped at once." The sale was a single trans- 

 action, and the lumber sold in its entirety. It is clear that the intention 

 of the parties did not contemplate that the contract was in any way sever- 

 able. Since the contract is entire, the defendant cannot be permitted to 

 accept pan and reject the remainder, unless there was an agreement 

 to this efteot. » • • Even if the defendant's story be accepted as 

 true, it shows at most only a warranty that the goods delivered shall 

 not contain any unfit or unmerchantable lumber. Since the 'defendant 

 has accepted a part of the lumber, the breach of warranty can give rise 

 to no right of partial rescission, but such acceptance does not bar a 

 counterclaim for damages. 



Overlooking Time in Contracts 



A Mobile manufacturing company agreed in writing to furnish 

 all mill work required for a certain dwelling house, as per plans 

 and specifications, for a lump sum of $2,718, but the contract was 

 silent as to when the work was to be furnished and as to when 

 it should be paid for. As affecting the right of the company 

 to enforce a lien on the other party becoming bankrupt, it became 

 important to determine when the debt became due, and the United 

 States district court for the southern district of Alabama decided: 



By the failure to specify a time for furnishing the material the per- 

 formance of the contract within a reasonable time was implied, and what 

 was a "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances of the par- 

 ticular case. » • » Neither does the contract specify when the amount 

 agreed to be paid for the material to be furnished was to be paid. No 

 specific time for such payment being fixed, and the contract being an 

 entire contract, the sum to be paid as therein provided was not due and 

 payable until a completion of the contract by the delivery and acceptance 

 of the material. • * * The entire fulfillment of the promise to fur- 

 nish the material was a condition precedent to the implied promise to 

 pay the sum of $2,718 named in the contract. Whenever there is a 

 contract to pay a gross sum for a certaiji and definite consideration, 

 the contract is entire. 



The court concludes that the time when the price became due 

 was when the manufacturing company had completed its contract. 

 (In re Hellams, 223 Federal Reporter, 460.) 



— 19— 



