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Pertinent Legal Findings 



Milling in Transit Privilege 

 The right of a lumber company to a refund of the amount of the 

 difference between local distance tariffs paid on inbound shipments 

 of rough lumber and the milling in transit rate was dependent upon 

 the company causing the lumber to be moved out under rates in 

 force when the inbound shipments were made, and, hence, the fin- 

 ished lumber, having been shipped out on reduced rates put in force 

 by lawful authority, there was no right to a refund. (Oklahoma 

 supreme court, Walton-Chandler Lumber Company vs. St. Louis & 

 San Francisco Railroad Company, 145 Pacific Eeporter 340.) 



Warranty of Title to Timber Sold 



"When timber is sold under a warranty of title, a third person who 

 buys from the purchaser is entitled to claim damages for breach of 

 the warranty, although the deed under which he took title contained 

 no express warranty. (Tennessee Supreme Court, Galloway-Pease Co. 

 vs. Sabin, 172 Southwestern Reporter 292.) 



Taxability of Logs 

 When the owner of land parts with ownership of standing timber, 

 some interesting and important rules of law relating to taxation of 

 property come into plaj-. Until then the land and the trees have 

 been assessed as one entire piece of property. Afterwards and until 

 the timber is cut, it is still properly taxable as a part of the real 

 estate, but the law takes notice of the separate ownership of the 

 trees, and makes the purchaser of the growing trees liable for the 

 part of the tax assessed against them. 



When trees have been cut they, of course, become chattels and are 

 taxable as such. The main difficulty which arises often is determina- 

 tion of the place where the logs are taxable. The courts have fre- 

 quently recognized the general rule that logs are taxable at the 

 place where they are found on the day when chattels are assessable, 

 and not where the owner resides. It has been decided, however, 

 that, under the statutes of several states, including Alichigan and 

 Wisconsin, logs in course of transportation to a particular mill, 

 where it is intended that they shall be manufactured into lumber, 

 are taxable in the district where the mill is located. For instance, 

 the supreme court of Michigan held that logs should be assessed for 

 taxation at the place of manufacture, where, at the time the assess- 

 ment was made, they were banked, ready for transportation to the 

 mUl, and were delayed merely on account of floating conditions of a 

 stream. In another case, the same court decided that logs floating 

 in a lake, so that, at the time fixed by the tax laws for assessment, 

 they were actually in different townships, although- intended to be 

 sent to a particular sawmill, were properly assessed in the township 

 where the mill was situated. In the same case, it was held by the 

 Michigan court that under a requirement of the Michigan statutes 

 all forest products be taxed in the township where found on a certain 

 date in the spring, except that, where such property is in course of 

 transportation to some point within the state, it should be taxed at 

 that place, and that under another statute providing .that logs piled 

 in any yard or railroad reserve should be assessed to the person 

 having control of the yard, reserve or place of storage — logs piled on 

 the right of way of a private railroad owned and used by a lumber 

 concern were assessable in the township where they were located at 

 the date fixed by law for assessing personal property. 



On the subject of the taxability of logs intended to be transported 

 from one state to another, the general rule has been stated by the 

 Kentucky court of appeals to be as follows: "Logs, ties, etc., are 

 taxable within the state where they were cut untU they are actualh' 

 delivered to a common carrier for transportation to their ultimate 

 destination, or are actually floating on their way, mere delivery of 

 them in readiness for transportation being insufficient." The Min- 

 nesota supreme court adopted this rule not long ago by holding that 

 where logs were cut, banked and boomed on the ice with intent of 

 exporting them from the state but were not delivered to the initial 

 carrier until after May 1 — the assessment date — they were subject to 

 taxation in Minnesota for the current year. In a still later case, the 



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same court decided that, although logs had been floated many miles 

 down the Mississippi, with intent to send them to an Iowa mill, they 

 were nevertheless taxable at the boom where they were found May 1, 

 being then held for the purpose of sorting, rafting and delivery to a 

 carrier for transportation down the river. 



Must Identify Logs to Levy Lien 



An important judgment handed down by Judge Mclrmes in the 

 county court at Vancouver, B. C, will, if sustained on an appeal, 

 have a far reaching effect. It is that loggers and camp employes 

 having a lien can claim on only those logs which they can identify. 

 The decision was given in the case of seven loggers against J. J. 

 Denman and William Symes, owners of limits at Holtham Sound, 

 and Barney & Cardieff, contractors, who were employed by them to 

 cut shingle bolts. The contractors hired the plaintiffs and fourteen 

 others and agreed to pay them so much per cord. They worked for 

 three months, and there being no money forthcoming on January 1 

 they put a lien on the bolts in the camp, which comprised only the 

 December cut, the previous two months' cut having been sold. The 

 lien covered claims for wages during the whole of the time they were 

 working and was plastered upon the whole camp affecting work done 

 by different gangs. The judge held that the loggers could claim only 

 on the logs which they could themselves identify as having cut and 

 cannot claim on logs cut in one month for their claims covering 

 logs cut in previous months and which have been shipped out and 

 sold, even though they were cut under the same contract. The judge 

 further held that this applied not only to the loggers but to the camp 

 cooks and others working around who could put a lien only upon logs 

 then in the camp and which had been cut by the men for whom they 

 were cooking. 



Damages for Failure to Deliver Lumber 

 After it has been established that one who lias contracted to sell a 

 quantity of lumber has rendered himself liable in damages for breach 

 of the contract, the question arises as to how much money can be 

 recovered against him. This point arose in the Indiana case of Fer- 

 guson vs. Pape, 62 Northwestern Eeporter 712 — a suit to recover for 

 defendant's failure to deliver certain logs and lumber. After finding 

 that when the sale was made the seller knew that the purchase was 

 being made for the purpose of resale by the buyer, the Indiana 

 appellate court said that, under the general rule of damages, the 

 buyer was entitled to recover the amount of his loss sustained on 

 account of the breach, as a direct result of the seller's failure to 

 deliver. ' ' These damages are usually stated to be the difference be- 

 tween the contract price and the market value at the time and place 

 of delivery. The law excludes uncertain and contingent profits as 

 damages for breach of a contract, and also such damages as could 

 not reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the 

 parties at the time they made it as the probable result of its breach. 

 If the lumber and logs in question had been purchased for the pur- 

 pose of a special resale, and that fact had been communicated to the 

 seller at the time of making the contract, the measure of damages 

 would be the profit which would have accrued had the seller per- 

 formed his contract. ' ' 



Standing Timber Sales in Kentucky 

 Under the statutes of Kentucky an oral contract for a sale of 

 standing timber is not enforceable, although immediate cutting and 

 removal of the trees be contemplated, and although the trees be 

 marked with the purchaser's brand. (Kentucky court of appeals, 

 Burris vs. Stepp, 172 Southwestern Eeporter 526.) 



Liability for Injury to Employe 



A lumber company engaged in operating a logging railroad is 

 liable for injury to an employe who was knocked from a locomotive 

 by a log which was negligently permitted to project too near the 

 track, unless he was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to 

 observe the presence of the logs. (North Carolina supreme court, 

 Buchanan vs. Eitter Lumber Company, 84 Southeastern Eeporter 50.) 



