Information Processing Theory 51 



a theory which can be stretched to fit anything. The genesis of 

 this difhcuhy lies in the fact that the theorist knows what he is 

 saying and so does his audience. Hence, it is often possible to put 

 together assumptions which, logically, will not fit, or to make 

 deductions which, logically, do not follow. These unfortunate 

 juxtapositionings may go unnoticed by an intelligent theorist and 

 his informed listeners, who can readily and unwittingly supply 

 the missing pieces, ignore the excesses, and beg the answer which 

 they know is there even if it is not. The computer, though, is a 

 very stupid audience. From one point of view, it may prove more 

 valuable now while it is stupid than later when it is not; for today 

 it will not tolerate vagueness. When a theorist with an idea sits 

 down to convey his idea to a inachine he almost invariably finds 

 that he must first sharpen it up. And when the machine attempts 

 to simulate the idea, the theorist almost invariably finds it will 

 not do what it is supposed to do. 



These lengthy elaborations on a fairly concise statement point 

 up the similarities between the process of computer simulation 

 and the other techniques of theory construction. The computer has 

 not answered the many problems which were formulated by these 

 other techniques. The computer will not make scientists out of 

 programmers. It is just another way of theorizing which has 

 certain special advantages, certain special disadvantages, and the 

 same old problems. 



1 have attempted to show how process models may be stated 

 and why computer simulation is often an appropriate means for 

 their analysis. It is quite legitimate to ask what such efforts to 

 date have implied about information storage and neural control 

 or, to be more classical, neurophysiology. When computer sci- 

 entists discover processes which appear to be useful building 

 blocks for explaining human behavior or for constructing artificial 

 intelligences, it is natural to ask if actual mechanisms for per- 

 forming these processes can be found within the central nervous 

 system. The observations of the reflex led Sherrington to inquire 

 as to its basis, with a great deal of benefit to science. Pavlov ex- 

 amined the conditioned reflex and based his psychology on it. 

 The discovery of more complex processes could likewise direct 

 efforts in neurophysiological research. 



