1/16 THE PROBLEM 



The knowledge that the proposed solution must be put to this 

 test will impose some discipline on the concepts used. In particular, 

 this requirement will help to prevent the solution from being a 

 mere verbalistic ' explanation ', for in the background will be the 

 demand that we build a machine to do these things. 



Consciousness 

 1/16. The previous sections have demanded that we shall make 

 no use of the subjective elements of experience; and I can antici- 

 pate by saying that in fact the book makes no such use. At 

 times its rigid adherence to the objective point of view may 

 jar on the reader and may expose me to the accusation that I am 

 ignoring an essential factor. A few words in explanation may 

 save misunderstanding. 



Throughout the book, consciousness and its related subjective 

 elements are not used for the simple reason that at no point have I 

 found their introduction necessary. This is not surprising, for the 

 book deals with only one of the properties of the brain, and with 

 a property — learning — that has long been recognised to have no 

 necessary dependence on consciousness. Here is an example to 

 illustrate their independence. If a cyclist wishes to turn to the 

 left, his first action must be to turn the front wheel to the right 

 (otherwise he will fall outwards by centrifugal force). Every 

 practised cyclist makes this movement every time he turns, yet 

 many cyclists, even after they have made the movement hundreds 

 of times, are quite unconscious of making it. The direct inter- 

 vention of consciousness is evidently not necessary for adaptive 

 learning. 



Such an observation, showing that consciousness is sometimes 

 not necessary, gives us no right to deduce that consciousness 

 does not exist. The truth is quite otherwise, for the fact of the 

 existence of consciousness is prior to all other facts. If I perceive 

 — am aware of — a chair, I may later be persuaded, by other 

 evidence, that the appearance was produced only by a trick of 

 lighting; I may be persuaded that it occurred in a dream, or 

 even that it was an hallucination; but there is no evidence in 

 existence that could persuade me that my awareness itself was 

 mistaken — that I had not really been aware at all. This know- 

 ledge of personal awareness, therefore, is prior to all other forms 

 of knowledge. 



11 



