1S8J.] ^^ [Carson. 



his troops. As he pressed forward to the town of Gettysburg on the 

 evening of the first of July, he was informed that the enemy had made 

 their appearance there in force ; that the First and Eleventh Corps 

 had been very hotly engaged, and that Gen. Reynolds had been killed. 

 He was directed to follow a road about two miles west of the main 

 one, and learned that Lieutenant Colonel Hayden, Assistant Inspector- 

 General of the Corps, was present with a gentleman from Gettys- 

 burg, who acted as a guide for the route that Gen, Sickles wished 

 him to take. Contrary to Gen. Humphreys' views who wislied to move 

 to the right so as to join Howard's left, Col. Hayden insisted that Gen. 

 Sickles wished him to approach by the Black Horse Tavern road, which 

 led towards the left directly to the enemy. With many misgivings Hum- 

 phreys obeyed. His movement occupied considerable time owing to the 

 crossings of Marsh run. He took the precaution of directing his column 

 to move quietly as it approached the road, and to close up, as he expected 

 to fixU in with the enemy. He soon found the enemy posted in force, but 

 unaware of his presence. He might have attacked them at daylight 

 Avith the certainty of at least temporary success, but as he was three miles 

 distant from the remainder of the army, he believed that such a course 

 would be inconsistent with the general plan of operations of the command- 

 ing General. As soon as he ascertained the exact condition of things, he 

 retraced his steps and bivouacked near Gettysburg about 1 a. m., on the 2d 

 of July. This delayed him several hours, and greatly fatigued his men. 

 It was a moonlight night, but hazy. The reference, which Gen. Hum- 

 phrej's makes to what others have admired as an exhibition of remarkable 

 skill in extricating his division from a dangerous position, is one of charac- 

 teristic modesty. He says : " It shows what can be done by accident. If 

 any one had been directed to take a division to the rear of the enemy's 

 army and get up as close as I did un perceived, it would have been thought; 

 exceedingly difficult, if not impossible to do it unnoticed."* 



It was subsequently ascertained that Col. Hayden had entirelj' .misap- 

 prehended Gen. Sickles' order, and that it had never been intended that 

 the division should march by way of the Black Horse Tavern. 



The next morning, the 2d, his division, forming the right of the Third 

 Corps, was massed on a ridge of elevated ground between Cemetery Hill 

 and Round Top, some four or five hundred yards in advance of the gen- 

 eral line. This placed the entire corps in great danger. In the afternoon 

 he was fiercely attacked in front and flank, and sustained some of the hot- 

 test fighting of the day. While under a heavy fire of infantry and artil- 

 lery — "I have never been under a hotter artillery and musketry fire com- 

 bined," he states — ^just at the moment he fouud it necessary to get his own 

 artillery out of the way as quickly as possible, and advance his whole? line 

 to pour a fire upon the charging eneni}', he received an order from Gen. 

 Birney informing him that Gen. Sickles had been wounded, and that he 



♦Testimony of Gen. Ilumplireys. Ilcport on the Conduct of tlie War. 1S65. 

 Vol. 1, p. 3S9. Ut supra, p. 39J. 



