172 THE TRANSFERABLE VOTE IN ELECTIONS. 



two votes, or three votes, respectively. At the election in 1909 

 the respective numbers of these three classes were 1,996, 1,43° and 

 1,934. So that, in comparing this election with the Johannesburg 

 one, I give the percentages of Cape Town votes, which average 

 about double the number of voters. In Johannesburg the numbers 

 of votes and voters are identical. 



In the example I quoted above, of a city of ten thousand voters 

 distributed in three parties, "A," "B," "C" with 6,000, 3,000 and 

 1,000 voters, respectively, an election of the whole city 

 for ten members, each voter having the right to give one 

 vote for each of the ten members, would have resulted in the return 

 of all ten members belonging to the "A" party, had the voting been 

 on strictly party lines, even if the "B" and "C" parties voted 

 together. The majority would have had a monopoly of the mem- 

 bers, as in the case of the three London boroughs in 1906 which 

 I mentioned. 



10. I now come to my last preliminary explanation, and will 

 attempt to show how Mr. J .Taylor, Town Clerk of Johannesburg, 

 managed in eight and a half hours to give expression to 

 the preferences of ten thousand five hundred and forty voters, con- 

 centrating on ten members ninety-eight and a half per cent, of the 

 votes that were capable of transfer, and that had been given for 

 twenty-two candidates ; how, in fact, he managed to carry out the 

 ideals of Hare and JolTn Stuart Mill ; which was done at Pretoria 

 also with complete success. 



11. There are two methods used for the transfer of non- 

 effective surplus votes, that of the English Municipal Representa- 

 tion Bill, 1908, adopted in the Transvaal, and a second method, 

 Gregory's Method, adopted in the Tasmanian Electoral Act of 

 1907, and used in their general election last year with great success. 



In the first of these the member retains his quota of all the 

 actual votes and voting papers ; and as many as possible of the 

 surplus votes and voting papers are given proportionally to the 

 next available preference candidates. 



In Gregory's method the member retains such a share of the 

 value of each voting paper as will give him his quota ; and all the 

 voting papers are marked with their remaining value, and dis- 

 tributed at that value, proportionately, to the candidates marked 

 on the voters' voting papers as the next available preferences. 



12. English Municipal Representation Bill Method. 

 Suppose there are seven candidates, "A," "B," "C," "D," "E," 

 "F" and "G," whose votes decline numerically in order from "A" 

 to "G" ; suppose that the quota is three thousand, which "B" gets, 

 while "A" has five thousand voting papers, on all of which other 

 preferences are marked. Suppose, further, that "D" has 2,250 

 votes. Proceeding, on the Transvaal method, to distribute "A's" 

 non-effective majority of two thousand, we take all the five 

 thousand votes in "A's" parcel and distribute them in sub-parcels 

 according to the next available preference marked on them. We 

 put all on which "C" is the next available preference in one parcel, 

 and so with "D," and so on. "A," with his surplus, and "B" 

 with his quota, have been elected. "B" is no longer an available 

 preference, and his name is now passed over whenever it occurs on 



