THE ALTERNATE VOTE. 



361 



13 

 14 



15 

 16 



18 



19 

 20 

 21 



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The correct expression for all the preferences of three 

 men for three candidates. 



No plan of selection will be found efficient unless it 

 secures that the best man is retained at the first count, 

 and gives an original vote a higher value than a subse- 

 quently expressed preference. 



Enumeration of the seven incorrect usual methods. 

 The single vote method described and shown liable to 

 error. 



The double \ote method similarly treated. 

 Borda's method similarly treated. 



The French method or double ballot similarly treated. 

 Ware's method similarly treated. 

 The Venetian method similarly treated. 

 Condorcet's practical method similarly treated. 

 Nan son's method. 



Nanson's proof, that under his method the best man 

 cannot be rejected at the first counting in the case of 

 three candidates. 



First variety election by absolute majority of original first 

 votes (8). Second, exclusion on receiving fewer com- 

 bined first votes and preferences than the number of half 

 the voters (9). Third, exclusion of two receiving less 

 than the average on a list where first votes count two 

 and preferences one (sections 21 and 10); if only one is 

 below the average he is excluded and his expressed 

 preferences elect one of the other two {21). 

 Illustrative example. 



More than three candidates. In Nanson's third list, if 

 first votes have a greater value than preferences, all 

 below the average may be excluded : and all votes and 

 preferences on the remaining list must then be altered. 

 The preference for the first vote may be expressed by 

 giving it a less value than the second, counting it as one 

 and the second preference as two ; in that case we must 

 exclude all who receive the average or more. 

 In cases of more than three candidates we continue 

 scrutinies till all but one candidate is excluded, or till 

 one has an absolute majority of first votes. 

 Tabular example with more than three candidates. 

 This is the only correct mode of securing an accurate 

 result. 



The working of the transferable vote for the election of 

 more than two candidates is simpler. 



The absolute correctness of Nanson's method in all 

 cases, and its simplicity should secure its universal adop- 

 tion. 

 I. The Royal Commission on Systems of election* state in 



their conclusions : — 



" We recommend the adoption of the Alternate Vote in cases 



where more than two candidates stand for one seat," 



*iQio. Cd. 5163. 



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27. 



29. 



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