364 



THE ALTERNATE VOTE. 



see its application presently (22). 



If we express in three columns by the numerals 2, i, o, the 

 vote and preferences of three committee men for three applicants, 

 marking the vote as 2, the preference as i, and the preference 

 of both over the third by marking him o, and add up these 

 columns, we get a correct expression of all their preferences. 

 Say P prefers A to B and B to C, ABC 



Q prefers B to C, and C to A, and P. 2 i o 



R prefers B to A, and A to C, and that Q. o 2 i 



iillmark their preferences as here given R. i 2 o 



3.5 I 



Each line expresses three preferences, there are nine alto- 

 gether. B is marked in the first line with one preference over C ; 

 in the second line with two preferences, that is with one over C 

 and one over A ; in the third line with two, one over A and one 

 over C ; that is five in all. A is marked in the first line with two 

 preferences, one over B, and one over C ; in the third line with 

 one over C ; three in all. C is marked in the second line with 

 one preference over A ; only one. A, B, C, have respectively 3, 

 5, and I preferences, nine in all. Thus adding up all expressed 

 preferences gives us the number of preferences which each appli- 

 cant obtains. 



12. Before going concisely over the seven usual methods of 

 selecting the best man, I would repeat the two essentials, 

 which must be found in an effective plan : it must be impossible 

 for the best man to be thrown out at the first count {5), and you 

 must not only count all preferences, original and alternate, but 

 you must give to the original preference a higher value than you 

 do to an alternate one (6). I would bespeak close attention ; for 

 time and space forbids more than a simple statement of each plan, 

 and a concise demonstration by a specific example of its possible 

 failure. 



13. The seven plans in general use are : — The Single Vote 

 Method, The Double Vote Method, Borda's Method, The French 

 Method of Double Elections or The Double Ballot, Ware's 

 Method, The Venetian Method, Condorcet's Practical Method 



14. The Single Vote Method. — The English Parliamentary 

 method, one vote given to one candidate. In this method, unless 

 one candidate gets an absolute majority, the result may be con- 

 trary to the wishes of the majority of the voters. Suppose three 

 candidates, A, B, C, receive respectively 5, 4, 3 votes : A is 

 elected. Yet, if the four electors who voted for B prefer C to 

 A, and the three who voted for C prefer B to A, both of the 

 defeated candidates, in a two candidate contest with A, would 

 have defeated him by 7 to 5. 



Here at the second count B is eleoted by a majority of 2 ; but 

 if the 5 who voted for A prefer C to B, C should have b«en 

 elected with a majority of 4. 



Thus the Single Vote may fail to select the best man ; he may 

 be thrown out on the first count. It may fail whether you elect 

 the highest or throw out the lowest. It may fail at the second 

 count if all preferences are not fully expressed. 



