36 MOORE— CONTRABAND OF WAR. [February 2, 



could not admit " that if such provisions were consigned to the port 

 of a belligerent (even though it should be a port of naval equip- 

 ment) they should therefore be necessarily regarded as contraband 

 of war." The true test appeared to be " whether there are circum- 

 stances relating to any particular cargo to show it that it is destined 

 for military or naval use." 



The United States was obliged to deal with the same question 

 in the case of the steamer Arabia, whose cargo, composed of rail- 

 way material and flour, destined to Japanese ports and consigned to 

 various commercial houses there, was condemned by the Russian 

 prize court at Vladivostok as contraband, on the strength of its 

 destination. The United States protested against this judgment as 

 involving a " disregard of the settled law of nations." The United 

 States declared that it was " vital to the legitimate maritime com- 

 merce of neutral states" that there should be "no relaxation" of 

 the distinctions with regard to contraband ; that there was and could 

 be " no middle ground " ; that " the criterion of warlike usefulness 

 and destination " had " been adopted by the common consent of civi- 

 lized nations, after centuries of struggle in which each belligerent 

 made indiscriminate warfare upon all commerce of all neutral states 

 with the people of the other belligerent, and which led to reprisals 

 as the mildest available remedy " ; that, while articles such as arms 

 and ammunition, self-evidently of war-like use, were contraband if 

 destined to enemy territory, yet articles such as coal, cotton, and 

 provisions, which, though ordinarily innocent, were capable of war- 

 like use, were " not subject to capture and confiscation unless shown 

 by evidence to be actually destined for the military or naval forces 

 of a belligerent " ; that " this substantive principle of the law of 

 nations" could "not be overridden by a technical rule of the prize 

 court that the owners of the captured cargo must prove that no part 

 of it" might reach the enemy forces; and that, such proof being "of 

 an impossible nature," its exaction would render neutral commerce 

 impossible and result in the condemnation of the innocent with the 

 guilty. In conclusion the ambassador of the United States at St. 

 Petersburg was instructed to express "the deep regret and grave 

 concern " with which his government had received the unqualified 



