292 BURR— THE TREATY-MAKING POWER [April 20, 



relations and the further reciprocal expansion of trade and commerce : 

 Provided, however, that said trade agreements before becoming operative 

 shall be submitted to the Congress of the United States for ratification or 

 rejection." 



The Presidents of the United States have uniformly supported 

 the view of Washington. Jn addition to maintaining this attitude 

 in the instances above set forth, we may cite the following examples. 

 In 1835, President Jackson vetoed a bill for the compromise of 

 claims allowed by the commissioners under a treaty. He said : 



" The Act is, in my judgment, inconsistent with the division of powers in 

 the Constitution of the United States, as it is obviously founded on the 

 assumption that an act of Congress can give power to the Executive or to the 

 head of one of the Departments to negotiate with a foreign government.""" 



In 1877, President Grant vetoed congressional resolutions directing 

 the Secretary of State to convey to certain republics the good wishes 

 of Congress on the ground that in the executive alone was vested 

 the right to conduct all correspondence with other sovereignties.*"' 



It would seem to be idle to enter into a long discussion of the 

 constitutional problem presented if the House of Representatives 

 should refuse to pass an appropriation necessary to carry a treaty 

 into effect. It is a problem political and national in its character and 

 not one for judicial arbitrament or determination. The question 

 presented, however, is simple enough and readily yields to analysis. 

 A treaty agreeing to pay money is none the less a treaty, whether or 

 no the money be paid. It constitutes an executory contract and 

 raises an obligation on the part of the United States to perform its 

 contract. Congress could repudiate this obligation, just as a corpo- 

 ration by its board of directors could refuse to honor its duly 

 executed obligation. But the power to make a valid treaty would be 

 untouched by such repudiation : the United States would remain 

 bound in international law. Congress, however, has never yet in its 

 history refused to recognize the obligation resting upon it, and it is 

 unlikely it ever will. If it should, the offended nation would have 

 whatever redress would be open to it under the principles of inter- 

 national law. The courts of the United States could not determine 

 such a controversy of purely national and political import. 



^"Richardson's Messages of the Presidents. Vol. IIT., p. 146. 

 ""Id., Vol. VII., pp. 43<^2. 



