•9I2-] OF THE UNITED STATES. 343 



cability and force of the constitutional provisions Mr. Justice Iredell 

 continued : 



" The article in the Constitution concerning treaties I have always con- 

 sidered, and do now consider, was in consequence of the conflict of opinions 

 I have mentioned on the subject of the treaty in question. It was found in 

 this instance, as in many others, that when thirteen different legislatures were 

 necessary to act in unison on many occasions, it was in vain to expect that 

 they would always agree to act as Congress might think it their duty to 

 require. . . . Similar embarrassments have been found about the treaty. 

 This was binding in moral obligation, but could not be constitutionally carried 

 into effect (at least in the opinion of many) so far as acts of legislation then 

 in being constituted an impediment, but by a repeal. The extreme incon- 

 veniences felt from such a system dictated the remedy which the Constitu- 

 tion has now provided, ' that all treaties made or which shall be made under 

 the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and 

 that the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Con- 

 stitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.' Under this 

 Constitution therefore, so far as a treaty constitutionally is binding, upon 

 principles of moral obligation, it is also by the vigour of its own authority 

 to be executed in fact. It would not otherwise be the supreme law in the 

 new sense provided for, and it was so before in a moral sense. 



" The provision extends to subsisting as well as to future treaties. I con- 

 sider therefore that when this Constitution was ratified, the case as to the 

 treaty in question stood upon the same footing, as if every act constituting 

 an impediment to a creditor's recovery had been expressly repealed, and any 

 further act passed, which the public obligation had before required, if a 

 repeal alone would not have been sufficient."""" 



Such, so far as expressed, were the rationes decidendi of the 

 judges who sat in this case. The judgment in itself deserves, how- 

 ever, the most scrupulous examination. It is given in the report 

 of the case and sustains the demurrer to the second plea. Now, that 

 demurrer was to the effect that after the incurring of the debt, and 

 after the passage of the Virginia act, and after the treaty of peace, 



" it was by the Constitution of the United States of America, among other 

 things, expressly declared, that treaties which were then made, or should 

 thereafter be made, under the authority of the United States, should be the 

 supreme law of the land, anything in the said Constitution, or of the laws 

 of any state, to the contrary notwithstanding;"^"' 



and that the plaintiff was within the protection of this treaty and 

 the Constitution. And this demurrer was sustained. 



^»3 Dallas, pp. 276-7. 

 -"' 3 Dallas, p. 204. 



