I9I2.] OF THE UNITED STATES. 357 



In 1854 Jean Louis Prevost, a French subject residing in France, 

 claimed as sole heir and proved his right. The State Supreme Court 

 held 



" that the right to the tax was complete, and vested in the State upon the 

 death of Francois Marie Prevost, and was not affected by the treaty with 

 France subsequently made." 



In affirming the judgment, Mr. Chief Justice Taney said: 



"We can see no valid objection to this judgment. ... If the property 

 vested [as was admitted] in him [the heir] at that time [the death of the 

 decedent], it could vest only in the manner, upon the conditions authorized 

 by the laws of the State. And, by the laws of the State, as they then stood 

 it vested in him, subject to a tax of ten per cent, payable to the State. And 

 certainly a treaty, subsequently made by the United States with France, 

 could not divest rights of property already vested in the State, even if the 

 words of the treaty had imported such an intention. But the words of the 

 Article, which we have already set forth, clearly apply to cases happening 

 afterwards — not to cases where the party appeared after the treaty, to assert 

 his rights, but to cases where the right afterwards accrued. And so it was 

 decided by the Supreme Court of the State, and we think, rightly."'^ 



There can be no question but that the remarks of Mr. Chief Justice 

 Taney are directly contrary to the decision in Ware z's. Hylton.-^" 

 Whether he recognized it to be so, inasmuch as he did not refer to 

 that case, is questionable. But if the analysis heretofore made have 

 any weight, it has been shown that the constitutional provision when 

 inserted was intended to have a retroactive force, and was in Ware 

 T's. Hylton given the significance and efficacy advocated by its 

 framers and contemporary interpreters. The failure of Mr. Chief 

 Justice Taney to appreciate the persuasive quality of the logic of 

 that case and its binding force is characteristic of his political atti- 

 tudes. His words, however, are rendered negligible by the later 

 opinion of the Court in Hauenstein I's. Lynham, wherein the decision 

 in Ware z's. Hylton is specifically approved and reaffirmed. 



"It will be observed," said the Court, "that the treaty-making clause is 

 retroactive as well as prospective. The treaty in question, in Ware z's. Hyl- 



^'^Ibid., p. 7. 



^"It is also interesting to note that in Geofroy vs. Riggs, 133 U. S., 256 

 (1889), infra pages 75-6, the interpretation placed by the Court in a fully 

 reasoned opinion on this French treaty of 1853 is wholly at variance with that 

 of Mr. Chief Justice Taney. 



