HUMAN REACTIONS IN A MAZE 119 



could start on equal terms. Making comparisons in terms of 

 errors, group R I would be on terms of equality with the chil- 

 dren and adults only after three and seven trials, respectively. 

 If it were not for this handicap equivalent to a number of trials, 

 the animals would learn the maze in a much fewer number of 

 trials than the adults. The conception as the sole principle of 

 explanation thus forces the further conclusion that the number 

 of trials necessary to learn a maze is inversely proportional to 

 general intelligence. 



2. The second hypothesis concerns the functional efficiency 

 of a plan of action. Let us suppose that a subject explores 

 both sides of each runway carefully seeking for two diverging 

 paths. He chooses one of these in a haphazard manner for 

 exploration. The exploration is designed to determine whether 

 or not this path is a blind alley. If by chance he choose the 

 true path, he continues until he again comes to the parting of 

 the ways. In case he chooses a blind alley, his mental effort 

 is now devoted to the task of schematizing its spatial relations 

 to the path over which he came and to the other diverging 

 path. His purpose is to emerge from each alley that proves 

 to be a blind and to continue on his way without any disturbance 

 of orientation. Provided this result were attained in every 

 case, the average number of initial errors for a group of sub- 

 jects would approximate half the number of blind alleys in the 

 maze. If the subject failed to maintain his orientation upon 

 emerging from a blind alley, returns over the true path, and 

 re-explorations of cul de sacs would result with a consequent 

 increase in the time and error values. This ability to reinstate 

 the previous sense of orientation upon emerging from a blind 

 alley is no easy task. It involves during the exploration the 

 construction of some representation of the spatial relation of 

 the runway to other paths, and the mental ability to hold this 

 scheme in mind until the previous orientation has been rein- 

 stated. The successful prosecution of such a plan of action does 

 not necessarily result in the mastery of the maze during the 

 first trial, because the subject is required to schematize and hold 

 in mind but one segment at a time. The first segment learned 

 may be forgotten long before the end of the maze is reached. 

 The subject may also be unable to unite the various parts into 

 a conceptual whole, and, granted the construction of a schematic 



