|{i:im{ksi:ntati<»n. 377 



Tlie most (k'liKH-iatic t'onn of i,'o\('riim('iit is that of tli(> people hy the 

 peoph' for tl)t' people, and yet, excellent as these principles aie, the 

 desired result is seldom attained. This, 1 helieve, is tlxw to a wrong 

 application of these admirable principles. John Stuart .Mill states the 

 case N'eiy clearly iis follows : — 



"In a representative boily," I>e says, "actually deliberating, the 

 minority must of course be overruled ; and in an etjual «lemocracy 

 (since the opinions of the constituents, when they insist on tliem, 

 determine those of the representative body) the majoi-ity of the 

 people, through their represent^itives, will outvote and prevail over the 

 minority and their representatives. 



" But does it follow that the minoritv should have no repre- 

 sentatives at all I Because the majority ought to pre\ail o\er the 

 minority, must the majority have all the votes, the minority none? 

 Is it necessary that the minoi'ity should not even he heard .' Nothing 

 but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the 

 needless injustice. 



" In a really e<[ual democracy every or any section woukl be repre- 

 sented, not disproportionately, but pioportionately. A majority of the 

 electors would ul\\a3's have a majority of the representatives; but a 

 minority of the electors would always liave a minority of the repre- 

 sentatives. Man for man, they would be as fully represented as the 

 majority. Unless they are, there is not etiual govei-nment, but a 

 government of inequality and privilege : one part of the people rule 

 over the rest ; there is a part wlujse fair and ec[ual share of in- 

 fluence in the representation is withheld from them, cDitrary to the 

 principle of democracy, which professes eijuality as its \ery root and 

 foundation." 



1 think that everybody will readily subscribe to these principles, 

 and any system which is basefl on then), and which does not attain the 

 logical result, must be manifestly wrong in its application 



After these preliminary remarks I shall pi'oceed to lii-ietlv review 

 a few ()f the systems employed by democratic communities to secure 

 lepresentation. I select five which fairly well cover the ground : - 



(a) Single member constituencies, or wards, each elector having 



one v<^)te. 

 (h) Single member constituencies, or wards, each elector having 

 one vote ; the candidate to secure election must obtain an 

 absolute majority of the votes recorded, thus introducing 

 the principle of the second ballot. 

 (c) Scrutin de Liste, or "general ticket," under wiiicli a con- 

 stituencv returns several members, every elector having a 

 )iumber of votes e(|ual to the number of members to be re- 

 turned, but can only give one vote to any one can<lidate. 

 {d) The "cumulative ^ote," under which each elector has as many 

 votes as theie are members to be elected in his constituency, 

 and may either "cumulate" them all on one candidate, or 

 divide them between the difi'eient canili<lates i)i any pi-o- 

 portion he pleases. 



