rKANSlT.KAI'.I.H VOTE AT MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. 2«J I 



Such is the working of effective voting or the transferable 

 ■: ote. 



Let us look now at the present system first with regard to 

 these two points: the representation it affords, and the number 

 of votes actually effective in electing the Councillors. 



10. Under the present plan of voting we have almost every- 

 where single-member ward elections by a relative majority. This 

 is the good old English method, used for the last 650 years, of 

 election by a relative majority : that is,, a member is elected when 

 he gets one more vote than the next highest candidate. ' In most 

 other civilized countries the member requires to get one more 

 than half the votes, or an absolute majority; and to secure 

 this, second ballots, or the transferable vote applied to the votes 

 given for the lowest of the candidates, are employed. 



Where in a single ward, or single-member constituency, we 

 have only two candidates, the election in England is on the same 

 principle — that of the absolute majority ; for in this case, as 

 there are only two candidates, the English rule of election by a 

 relative majority, that is, by one more vote than the highest 

 candidate, means election by one more than half the votes. 

 The relative majority coincides with the absolute majority 

 where there are only two candidates, and we see the present 

 plan at its best. 



11. Yet here in the closest possible contest — in our case 

 of 51 voters — the 25 voters for the unsuccessful candidates get 

 no representation, because they were one fewer than the 26, 

 who elected the member. The last voter for the successful 

 candidate decided, in fact ( 1) which of the two lots of 25 voters 

 should have representation, and which should not; (2) which 

 25 votes should be effective, and elect the member, and which 

 should be non-effective useless votes. In such a case a majority 

 of one decides these questions. The same thing would happen 

 under present rules, were three members being elected _ in 

 place of one. One single voter might have the power of saying 

 which half of the voters should be represented by three members, 

 and which half by none. 



12. Where there are more than two candidates the draw- 

 backs are greater. At the last Municipal election in the 

 Municipality of Oaremont, there were four candidates for one 

 seat : 223 votes were given for the member elected, but the other 

 three candidates received 312 votes, so that 223 votes, a minority 

 of 89, elected the member, and were represented by him. One 

 hundred and forty-four votes were effective in the election. 

 While 391, or 100 more than double that number were non- 

 effective, wasted votes, so far as the election of any one was 

 concerned. 



In a close contest— in our case of 51 voters— 4 candidates 

 might have received 14, I3> I2 > I2 votes respectively. In such a 

 case 14 voters, a minority of 23 would secure representation; 

 while 27 voters failed to do so. The actual Claremont ^T7^ 



/Po°° 9 *o/* 



