294 TRANSEERABLE VOTE AT MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. 



tory than even at the two previous elections, when six and seven 

 me.mbers respectively were elected. Thirteen members got the 

 quota, the fourteenth was only seven votes short of it, and the 

 fifteenth was less than fifty short. Any section of voters, num- 

 bering 234 voters, had it in its power to return a member ; and 

 the Council was thoroughly representative of the voters. In 

 giving evidence before the Commission of the House of Lords, 

 which in 1910 gave its Report Cd. 5163, Lord Courtenay stated 

 that in his opinion 15 or 17 members of Parliament were not too 

 many to be elected in one constituency by the transferable vote. 



2^. The fact that with the transferable vote the electoral' 

 area is at least three times as large as at present, increases the 

 inducement for two or three candidates with similar opinions to 

 work together ; to form a ticket, each member of which in trying 

 to secure support for himself asks also for second and lower 

 choices for his companions, just as they are doing for him 

 in districts where they are popular. 



To revert to our illustrative example. We would have an 

 electoral area three times as large, with 153 voters, and in place 

 of six candidates we may very probably have seven. Say one 

 group of the three old members, a ticket of three; another group 

 might be made by two of the formerly unsuccessful candidates; 

 and two independents, well known in the area, might be fighting 

 for their own selves alone. The larger group would each urge 

 all their voters to place their three members at the top of their 

 list of choices; dividing the work by three, and each helping the 

 election of the other two by second choices, on what, he fondly 



hopes, will be his surplus. The quota will now b e 3 3_j"T" T = 39- 



If one of the independents is so well known and so well liked as 

 to get 39 supporters' votes, his election is sure. He need not 

 get 39 first choice votes ; for, where a second choice or lower 

 choice becomes effective, it counts just as much as a first choice, 

 if it comes from an unsuccessful candidate. 



24. Let us look now at the nine drawbacks of the single 

 ward election and see what the transferable vote does for them." 



ist. The transferable vote gives true representation to 

 every voter. 



2nd. It wastes no votes, where the voter uses the privilege 

 it offers. 



3rd. There is a much larger choice of candidates. 



4th. The faddists have lost the chance the single ward 

 election gave them, their votes now carry only their own proper 

 value ; if their number entitles them to a representative, they will 

 get one ; but their votes no longer have a fictitious value, owing to 

 their being only two candidates. 



5th. The personal element of antagonism is gone; each 

 candidate is struggling for the quota, not fighting one antagonist. 



6th. Undue local influence is gone. Local influence is now 

 worth just as in the case of the faddists — exactly its numerical 



