A ' FAUST PROl'.LEM. 1 57 



first. The very fact that Faust asks a further question about 

 Mephisto's declaring himself "a part of that power" shows he 

 is satisfied with what referred to the other part of the saying 

 which he called an enigma. 



I deem it, for our investigation, of such importance to gain 

 a clear insight into what I would like to call the logical structure 

 of our passage, that T must ask your patience for an imaginary 

 conversation built on similar lines. 



Let us suppose a man — thinking of what he has learned in 

 his studies of the nature of light — utters the (intentionally 

 obscure) paradox, " A green leaf is not green." 



This is, of course, absolute nonsense if the words are, each 

 of them, taken in their everyday meaning. We are prepared,, 

 when the other of the two speakers has asked for an explanation, 

 to hear that — if these words do express a truth — one or more 

 of them is used in a sense given to it for the nonce by the maker 

 of the paradox. It will be found, when we have heard the ex- 

 planation, that any paraphrase will almost unavoidably contain 

 some such words as " what you call " and " what I call," etc. 



The explanation being demanded, we suppose it is given in 

 this form : First a general statement, which once more is not 

 quite clear to the hearer, and which does not at once seem 

 directly connected with the former : " White light or sunlight is 

 nothing but a mixture of colours." This is followed by an ex- 

 planation of the nature of light and of the fact that things are 

 only seen because of their reflecting the light that falls on them. 

 or part of that light. And this having been stated, the whole 

 is then shown to contain the elucidation of the first paradox. The 

 speaker continues in some such words as : 



" So then, we see that the leaf which 3'o;i call green only seems 

 so to you because it absorbs all other colours and reflects only 

 the green. It does not contain any green-colour producing sub- 

 stance ; if any light that contains no green is thrown upon it, it 

 will appear black ; it is not what / called green, i.e., it is not green 

 of its own nature." 



Now the scheme here illustrated is the one I believe exists 

 in our passage. I will therefore first enquire into the meaning 

 of, " Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint." and attempt to find 

 an elucidation in the three lines that follow : 



Und das mit Recht ; denn alles, was entsteht, 



1st wert dass es zn Grnnde geht ; 



Drum besser war's dass nichts entstiindc'' 



These lines are in themselves so clear and plain that we need 

 not spend time in commenting upon them, except in so far as to 

 emphasise the fact that the words " und das mit Recht, denn " 

 show beyond the possibility of doubt that they are intended to 

 justify Mephisto's " Verneinen." This verb has been translated 

 by " to deny," and it seems to me that too close an adhesion lo 

 its first and more literal meaning of " to say no " has caused aU 



