TRUTH AMONG THE PRAGMATISTS. 



By Rev. Sidney Read Welch, B.A., D.D., Ph.D. 



Amongst the recent systems of philosophy that liave 

 attempted to give us a reasoned account of the universe which 

 falls within our experience, pragmatism is the most loudly 

 trumpeted. Its vogue in popular literature is due to the fact 

 that it has a simple and taking meaning, which is not its real 

 meaning, i.e., not that which we get from its chief exponents, 

 when they are pressed by the cross-examination of the profane. 



It would be idle to try to examine the whole basis of its 

 philosophy in half an hour. But perhaps we may deal briefly 

 with one of its aspects, and that not the least important. " What 

 is truth?" is a question that every philosophy must face. The 

 pragmatists have given their answer, and it is this that we shall 

 try to understand. 



I propose to examine the pragmatic definition of truth 

 according to pragmatic methods of arriving at the truth. What 

 the methods are may best be stated in the words of an arch- 

 pragmatist. Prof. W. James. 



" Tlie pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling meta- 

 physical disputes that otherwise might be interminable- What dif- 

 ference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than 

 that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, 

 then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute 

 is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, v.'e ought to be able to show 

 some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other 

 being right-" * 



Reading the statement of method, one is at once pre- 

 pared to admit with the pragmatists that pragmatism is not 

 altogether a new system, but rather a new name for some old 

 ways of thinking. There is a dangerous family likeness between 

 the above method and that of the noble knight. Sir Hudibras : 



For when disputes are wear3-'d out. 



'Tis interest still resolves the doubt- 

 To make the likeness more startling, the pragmatists actually 

 use the word interest in this connexion. Thus Schiller, in liis 

 '* StiKlies in Humanism "f : 



" To determine, therefore, whether an answer to any question is 

 true or false, we have merely to note its effect upon the enquiry in which 

 we are interested, and in relation to which it has arisen. And if these 

 effects are favourable, the answer is true and good for our purpose, 

 and useful as a means to the end we pursue." 



To hold the balance even between the pragmatists and 

 Butler's noble knight, it is only fair to state that Sir Hudibras held 

 self-interest to be the ruling test, whilst the pragmatists generally 

 have imagined that they can estabHsh an interest entirely sub- 



* " Pragmatism." p- 45. 

 t P- 154- 



