KI.IU'TOKAI. K1-:F()R.M I'UOl'ORTIOXAL RErRKSEXTATK )X . 4OI 



comes lip. With the transferable vote each member get> as far 

 as possible the same number of votes or the quota. When, 

 with an increased number of voters, there is an additional quota 

 to spare over and above that at the last election, you have this 

 increase very prominently made manifest, and you have an 

 automatic index to the expediency of your claim to have one 

 more member. 



Thirdly, a very much more troublesome question-^that of 

 redistribution — would also be completely avoided. It is one of 

 the most difficult and troublesome questions to settle ; and with 

 an increasing population it will become, not only a chronic, 

 but a constant source of strife. 



In the South African Union, after the Bloemfontein catas- 

 trophe, a Commission of highly-paid Judges — the verv best men 

 we could obtain — had to leave their judicial functions anil busy 

 themselves in settling the boundaries of 121 new constituencies, 

 each with as nearly as possiljle 3.000 voters. This thev accom- 

 plished with great difficulty just before the elections were held. 

 ^^'ithin nine months the results of the new census showed us 

 that, owing to the diminution of voters in Cape Town at one 

 end. and owing to the influx of newcomers in the Rand at the 

 other end, there will have to be a new redistribution with fresh 

 boundaries, and the formation of fresh electoral divisions at 

 both these places. 



With single-member constituencies this will be vour ex- 

 perience constantly, and time and energ)- will be frittered awav 

 on endless disputes, to the detriment of the country. All this 

 needless trouble and loss would be avoided by the adoption of 

 proportional representation and the transferable vote. 



Fourthly, you would have one vote one value, and each 

 member elected by the same number of voters, an utter 

 impossibility with single-member divisions, or, in fact, with 

 more divisions than one ; for though each division might, as in 

 the Union, contain as far as possible an equal number of voters, 

 that would not ensure that in each an equal number of voters 

 voted ; and, unless they did, you can neither have one vote one 

 value, nor the same number of voters electing the member. 



rifthly. by this system you would ensure the election of the 

 very best men in the country. Canvassing would become im- 

 possible, so far as the whole constituency was concerned, and 

 to a large extent unnecessary, so far as local interests go: for 

 the contest would no longer be with other local candidates. 

 Each division would have to concentrate on the strongest public 

 man with local influence. Instead of a contest between ■ local 

 men, each spending money legitimately enough in asking for 

 votes to get him in, you will have the voters themselves doing 

 all this asking for votes, to procure the services of a good ]Miblic 

 man, who is willing to make the sacrifices that a devotion of 

 a large portion of his time and attention to the service of the 



