192 



speak of its power, we mean nothing more than the united powers of a 

 concurring majority. And hence, instead of regarding as sovereign the 

 fictitious entity that we are accustomed to regard as such, we miglit with 

 greater propriety say that the actual sovereign is the majority that acts, 

 and that, with every change in the constitution of such majority, we have 

 a different sovereign. (/) 



Hence, it is easy to perceive that the doctrine of corporate sovereignty — 

 wliich is the form in wliich the doctrine of sovereignty is now most usually 

 asserted — is inconsistent with the original doctrine. For the latter assumes 

 the existence of a single supreme ruler or sovereign, whose power is cer- 

 tainly indivisible, and may be absolute ; but the latter rests upon the 

 assumption that there are several officers or rulers, in each of whom 

 political poAver is vested, and, hence, that the sovereign powers of the 

 government are not only divisible, but actually divided ; and conse- 

 quently that the power of each is limited by the condition that others 

 shall concur in its exercise. Accordingly all the great constitutional 

 struggles that have occurred in history have been in effect contests 

 between the doctrine of personal, and that of corporate sovereignty, and 

 the triumph of the latter is justly regarded as having finally overthrown 

 the former. 



(8) But latterly the doctrine of corporate sovereignty has been asserted 

 in another form that bids fair in this country and in others inclining to 

 republicanism to supplant the doctrine as originally expressed. This, 

 which may be called the doctrine of the sovereignty of the State or of the 

 people, results from the distinction, now generally recognized, between 

 the State and the government, and asserts that the sovereignty is vested, 

 not in the latter, but in the former. 



But this doctrine must be clearly distinguished from another that passes 

 by the same name. In all liberal governments either all, or a large pro- 

 portion of the adult male citizens participate in electing representatives. 

 And in this country the electors are also vested by law with the power of 

 changing the constitution of the government, either by constitutional 

 conventions or otherwise. Hence, when we speak of the sovereignty of 

 the people, refei'ence is generally made to the electors only and not to the 

 people generally, or the State as distinguished from the government or 

 political organization of the State. But obviously the electors are part of 

 the political organization or government, and hence, the doctrine of sov- 

 ereignty of the people, in this sense, does not differ essentially from the 

 doctrine of corporate sovereignty, as stated in the preceding paragraph. 



Hence, to avoid this ambiguity, the expression, "the sovereignty of the 

 people," should be disused, and instead of it we should speak only of the 

 "sovereignty of the State," by which is meant the sovereignty of the 

 whole people, or the State as distinguished from the political organization 

 of the State or government. 



Of tlie two forms of the doctrine of sovereignty last adverted to — namely, 

 the doctrine of corporate sovereignty and that of the sovereignty of the 



