197 



not for their actual influence on political speculation, would be too trans- 

 parent to notice — the conclusion itself presents a peculiarly artful and 

 effeetive example of the fallacy of irrelevant conclusion or ignoratio 

 eTenchi. For, while it seems to respond to the problem propounded, it 

 does not really do so, but, when construed according to Hobbes' own 

 definitions of the terms used, assumes a very different meaning, or rather 

 becomes devoid of all material significance. For, as defined by Hobbes, 

 rigJit signifies merely the absence of restraint imposed by law {lex).* 

 Hence the proposition, that the power of the sovereign, is not limited bj' 

 law, regarded as the expressed will of the sovereign, simply asserts the 

 truism, equally applicable to the sovereign and all others, that a man's 

 power cannot be said to be limited by his own will. So with regard to 

 the termj/'wsi, "the definition of injustice, " he says, "is no other than the 

 not performance of contract, and whatever is not unjust, is just. "f Hence 

 the conclusion merely asserts that the power of the sovereign is not limited 

 by contract. Which, according to Hobbes' theory, is very true ; for 

 he is not party to the social contract, and is not bound by any other for 

 want of a superior power to enforce 11.% 



So also, with regard to the duty of obedience in the subject, appa- 

 rently asserted — this, according to Hobbes' definition, means nothing 

 more than the fear of evil consequences to be inflicted by the sovereign 

 for disobedience, and ex vi termini must be admitted to exist precisely to 

 the extent that there is ground for such fear. 



Hence, translated into plain English, the conclusion asserted is nothing 

 more than that the so-called right of the sovereign is an unbridled or law- 

 less power, to which prudence demands of the subject that he should sub- 

 mit in order to avoid worse consequences. This is an altogether different 

 proposition from that which the author undertook to establish, and which 

 he apparently asserts, viz., that the rigJit of a sovereign over the fortunes 

 and the persons of his subjects, and the corresponding duty of the subject 

 to obey, is unlimited ; but nevertheless the conclusion is habitually used 

 by him and others, as though equivalent to that proposition. 



In fine, the theory of Hobbes rests wholly upon the assumption that the 

 will of the government is the paramount moral standard by which justice 

 and injustice, and right and wrong, generally, are to be determined ; and 

 from'this it follows inevitably that, in the proper sense of the term, neither 

 the sovereign, nor — in relation to the sovereign — the subject can have auj' 

 rights, or be subject to any duties or obligations, (j) 



% 6. Kant's Argument. 



Kant, like Hobbes, asserts the absolute or unlimited power of the sov- 

 ereign over his subjects; and, like him, is guilty of a manifest petitio 

 principii in his reasoning, which is as follows : It is " the right of every 



* Right is that liberty wliicli the law leaveth us {DeC'orpore Politico, Bk. ii, Ch. x, § 3). 

 |i«>., p. 72. tLev., 85. 



PROC. AMER. PHILOS. SOC. XXXIV. 148. Z. PRINTED AUG 7, 1895. 



