214 



will always be, whether the example belongs to the rule or to the exception. When one 

 case is brought forward which is certainly an exception, the assertor will, in nine cases 

 out of ten, refuse to see why it is brought forward. He will treat it as a fallacious argu- 

 ment against the rule, instead of admitting that it is a good reason why he should define 

 the method of distinguishing the exceptions : he will virtually and perhaps absolutely 

 demand that all which is certainly exception shall be kept back, simply that he may be 

 able to assume that there is no occasion to acknowledge the difficulty of the uncertain 

 cases."— /d., pp 270, 271. 



(c) "After mathematics, physical science is the least amenable to the illasions of feel- 



" The processes of scientific induction involve only the first elements of reasoning, and 

 present such a clear and tangible surface as to allow no lurking place for prejudice ; 

 while questions of polities and morals, to which the deductive method, or common logic, 

 as Bacon calls it, is peculiarly applicable, are ever liable to be swayed or perverted by 

 the prejudices he enumerates " {Novem Organum, Aph. xl. Editor's note). The last refer- 

 ence is to Bacon's celebrated doctrine of Idols {efdcoXa, illusions, or false appear- 

 ances)— Orr/awif/n, Aph. xxsviii, et seq.— one of the most profound and valuable parts of 

 his works, and which we cite as authority for our own strictures. 



It may be added that the logical processes involved in the Mathematical and the Ex- 

 perimental Sciences are so extremely simple as to render their non-observance almost 

 impossible ; while in Politics, Morality, and the science of human nature generally, they 

 are so difficult as hardly to be overcome by the greatest genius. 



Of this, the most striking example is presented by the celebrated Hobbes— the most 

 powerfully logical genius and the most profound political philosopher since Aristotle. 

 But his preeminent mental gifts were, to a large extent, neutralized by the almost insane 

 dread of the miseries of civil war, generated by his own experience, or inherited from 

 his mother: of whom it is related that she was prematurely delivered of the philoso- 

 pher by reason of the fright into which she was thrown by the report of the approach of 

 the Spanish Armada. From this and the associations of his life he was naturally led to 

 espouse the royal cause in the great rebellion ; and thus it resulted that his work, com- 

 posed at an advanced age, after his political opinions were formed, is but a magnificent 

 polemic in support of a preconceived conclusion, originating in the idiosyncrasies of his 

 nature, and his peculiar experiences. Yet, in the opinion of Leibnitz, he was one of " the 

 only two'" (the other was Grotiusl " who were capable of reducing morals and jurispru- 

 dence to a science." " So great an enterprise," he says, " might have been executed by 

 the deep searching genius of Hobbes, if he had not set out from evil principles " (Mcin- 

 tosh's nissfrtations). 



As it is, his works, on account of the unrivaled style, the logical power, and the pro- 

 found and penetrating genius displayed in them, constitute by far the most valuable 

 contribution to political science in modern times; and, in the critical examination to 

 which I propo.se to subject them, it is my hope, that 1 may not only point out the dan- 

 gerous fallacies contained in his reasoning, rendered trebly formidable by his logical 

 skill and polemical ability, and by a style that is nearly the perfection of expression, but 

 that I may also call back the attention of my readers to writings preeminently deserving 

 of consideration, not only from their intrinsic merits, but from the fact that in them is 

 to be found the source and spring of modern political philo.sophy. 



Another instance, no less striking, is presented by Austin— a writer hardly inferior to 

 Hobbes in logical capacity, and far more fair-minded and disposed to observe the re- 

 quirements of logic, and onewhose works, in thedepartmentof jurisprudence, are hardly 

 of less value than those of Hobbes. As far as can be judged there was no particular dis- 

 position on his part towards arbitrary government, but the particular bias (or, as Bacon 

 would call it, idol) to which he was subjected was the notion, derived from Bentham and 

 Blackstone, that the law (jus) is mere expression of thn will of the sovereign or supreme 

 government. This he accepted, with unquestioning faith, as his first principle, and from 

 it, with an intrepidity of logic that is much to be admired, he deduced his whole theory. 



(d) The doctrine of absolute sovereignty is at once an attempted solution of the problem 

 of the rights, or ri4,'htful powers, of the State— which will be discussed fully in the body ot 



