215 



this work— and, also, to a certain extent, a theory as to the nature of the State. Regard- 

 ing it as wholly false, and as even absurd, I deem it a matter of importance, in order 

 to avoid embarrassment in our investigations, to dispose of it before entering upon our 

 main subject. Otherwise, as will be seen, we would find it necessary, at every step of our 

 progress, to interrupt our investigations in order to refer to and refute tliis almost uni- 

 versal prejudice. 



Another motive, scarcely less ])0werful, for introducing the subject here is to vindicate 

 the strictures contained in the text as to the almost universal non-observance of logic by 

 modern political theorists, and the resulting fallacious and inconsequent methods of 

 reasoning characterizing their writings. In executing this task. I shall freely avail my- 

 self of the technical names of the several fallacies used by logicians ; for, though this 

 may give something of the appearance of pedantry to my discourse, there is no other 

 method by v/hich the task can be so briefly and effectively accomplished. 



(c) The terms "sovereign" and "sovereignty" have widely departed from their 

 original meaning. The former term is equivalent to the low Latin siiperamis (foTmeA with 

 suffix anus from Latin super), and etymologically it denotes merely superiority, and 

 hence, in a political sense as originally used, it denotes merely the monarch or other 

 supreme officer of a State, and its correlative, sovereignty, the jjower vested in the sover- 

 eign. Both terms are strictly comparative, and there is nothing in them to imply that 

 the sovereign or supreme power in the State is absolute or unlimited ; all that is implied 

 is that the sovereign is superior to the other officers of the State, and his power superior 

 to theirs. Hence, as originally used, the terms were applied with equal propriety, not 

 only to the king or monarch, but to his feudatories, who each were said to be sovereign in 

 their own domain. Afterwards the term came to be restricted to the monarch only, from 

 whom it was transferred to the government generally; and afterwards, as will be 

 explained, to the State as distinguished from the government and various other abstrac- 

 tions. The term is, therefore, now one of the most vague in the language, and, as 

 observed by a late American writer, it " is seldom used by two respective writers as 

 embodying the same notion, and is oftener used to supply the absence of a distinct 

 notion "—that is to say, it is used by different writers with aU sorts of different mean- 

 ings, and still more frequently without any distinct meaning at all. He is, therefore, 

 of the opinion, in which I entirely agree, that "because of its uncertainty, of its special 

 unfitness as applied to a federal State, and of its suggestion of absolutism, the word 

 should be dropped," or, at least, ostracised for a while. " As used by some," he adds, 

 " it is not deceptive or dangerous ; but it will not be so used, and in the future as in the 

 past will breed disorder and anarchy " (Bliss on Sovereigtity , pp. Ill, 175). 



In order to guard against the numerous unfortunate associations of the term, we sub- 

 join the just and sober observations of Mr. Ahrens upon the subject : 



" '^\\e sovereignty .... has been confounded with omnipotence and absolutism, and 

 centralized, instead of being conceived organically and as dividing itself among the sev- 

 eral domains of the social order. Nevertheless this conception is in accord with the true 

 sense of the word. Many theories, it is true, have been built upon the nature of sov- 

 ereignty (a vague word originating in the Latm of the Middle Ages from super ioritas 

 superanus), which lends itself readily to arbitrary conceptions, but, according to its 

 true sense, the term denotes merely a power which, in its own domain, decides finally 

 without being submitted in this respect to a superior authority. In this sense we rightly 

 speak of a court of justice which decides finally as sovereign, but as the social order is 

 au organic whole of several spheres of life, of which each ought, in virtue of its 

 autonomy, to decide, in last resort, upon a certain class of relations left to its determina- 

 tion, each sphere of life is sovereign in its degree and in its kind. This acceptation of 



the notion of sovereignty was not unfamiliar to the epoch of the Middle Ages 



In effect, in the feudal hierarchy, the sovereignty was always attributed to the last 

 member. 'Each baron,' says Beaumanoir, 'is sovereign in his barony.' .... What is 



said here of the baron applies to-day to every free personality Every man is sov- 



eigu in the sphere of action where it belongs to him to act finally without being responsi- 

 ble to a superior authority. It is the same with the family and with the commune 



"As to the mode of exercise of the sovereignty, it is to be received as a fundamental 



