CHAPTER 1. 



Op the Nature of the State. 



§ 13. Of the Definition of the State, and of lis Several Kinds. 



(1) From what has been said ia tlie Introduction, it may be inferred 

 that political science in its present state, is beyond all others prolific in 

 logical fallacy ; and this conclusion will be found to be verified at every 

 step of our further progress. This arises, not from any peculiar lack of 

 ability in political writers — for, as we have seen, those who are responsible 

 for these fallacies, are the very foremost of their class, and some of them 

 preeminent, among all classes, in genius and even in logical capacity — 

 but principally from two causes already adverted to, that are character- 

 istic rather of the age than of any particular class or individual — namely, 

 bias or prejudice, and contempt, or, at least, practical neglect of logic. 



The latter, as we have observed, is in great measure, an eifect, of which 

 the former is the cause. For, in the absence of disturbing causes, to rea- 

 son logically is, for men of some clearness of intellect, as natural as to 

 walk in the right direction ; or, if a mistake occurs, it is readily detected. 

 But where men reason only to support preconceived opinions, in whose 

 favor they are warmly interested, there is no absurdity of Which they are 

 not capable. And it may be added, as bias is the most fruitful cause of 

 the non-observance of the rules of logic, so the rigid observance of those 

 rules is the only effectual remedy for it. 



Hence, in our own investigations, to avoid the pitfalls into which others 

 have fallen, it behooves us, above all things, to be careful in our logical 

 processes ; and on this account it will be found advantageous, even at 

 the expense of some appearance of pedantry, to continue to make use of 

 familiar logical rules and logical terms. 



Of all the fallacies to which political writers are addicted, the most 

 common, and at the same time most serious, is the fallacy of petitio prin- 

 cipii, or of the illegitimate assumption of first principles. It has indeed 

 been said that all logical reasoning necessarily involves a petitio principii, 

 and this is so far true that in every syllogism the conclusion is in fact in- 

 volved in the premises, and when the premises are admitted, inevitably 

 follows. And so, in any legitimate chain of deductive reasoning, how- 

 ever extensive, the last conclusion is in fact involved in the premises first 

 assumed, or, in other words, in the first principles — as for instance, the 

 most recondite theorems of mathematics, in a few simple maxims and 

 definitions. Nor is reasoning possible without the assumption of first 

 principles. Until these are agreed upon all discussion is mere sound. 



Generally our first principles must be obtained from observation of 



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