225 



Amonsj these one of the most remarkable is the definition of Bluntschli 

 and his American followers, already adverted to ; which defines the State 

 as an " organism," or as "an organic being," having a soul and body, a 

 wi'.l, a conscience, and active organs, and, in the opinion of Bluntschli, 

 even as being of the masculine gender. (6) This is obviously an extreme 

 violation of the third of the rules above specified, which demands that 

 the words used in the definition should be clearer tlian the term defined. 

 Here the term, "organism," is used in an entirely new sense, which is 

 not defined, and which it is extremely difficult to define. It vaguely sug- 

 gests that there are, in the nature of man, certain principles of action, from 

 which result certain characteristics of the State similar or analogous to 

 those characterizing natural persons. But what these elements of human 

 nature and resulting character istics of the State, in fact, are, can only 

 be determined by extended and laborious observation ; and, even when 

 determined, they do net properly enter into the definition, but belong 

 rather to the theory of the nature of the State — the subject of our future 

 investigations ; or, in other words, to the sequel, rather than to the begin- 

 ning of our discourse. 



Another example of vicious definition is given us by a late American 

 writer, who assumes, among "the peculiar cliaracteristics of the organi- 

 zation which we term the State," numerous qualities that may, or may 

 not, belong to it — and which, at all events, do not properly belong to the 

 definition — and among others the possession of absolute and unlimited 

 power. 



" The State," he says, " is sovereign. This is its most essential princi- 

 ple What now do we mean by this all-important term and princi- 

 ple, ' the sovereignty?' I understand by it original, absolute, unlimited, 

 universal power over the individual subject and over all associations of 

 subjects."* This indeed is but an expression of the prevailing doctrine of 

 sovereignty, which has already been fully considered. It is again alluded 

 to simply for the purpose of observing, that whether true or not, the pro- 

 position has no place in the definition of the State, or among the postu- 

 lates or axioms of political science. If the proposition be construed as re- 

 ferring to the actual power or might of the State, its truth or falsity is to 

 be determined by historical evidence ; or, if it refer to the rightful power, 

 or right of the State, by the principles of jurisprudence, or right. In 

 either case, if true, it can be proved, and hence, to assume it in the defini- 

 tion, or otherwise without proof, is an illegitimate assumption ; or, in 

 other words, a petltio principii. 



Numerous other instances of the same fault occur ; some of which are 

 referred to in the note. 



(3) The above review of the current definitions of the State (though I 

 fear somewhat tedious) will serve to guard us against errors into which 

 it seems men are peculiarly prone to fall. Thus guarded we will find no 



* Political Science, etc., Burgess, Professor of History, Political Science and Interna- 

 tional Law, Dean of the University Faculty of Political Science in Columbia College. 

 Vol. i, pp. 51, el seq. (c) 



