228 



There is, indeed, some difficulty in determining what amount of 

 dependence would be sufficient to deprive the dependent society of title 

 to the name of State ; but this difficulty occurs throughout all the depart- 

 ments of natural history — as, for instance, is illustrated by the difficulty 

 in determining where vegetable life and where animal life begins ; and is, 

 therefore, no objection to the definition ; in which the principle of dis- 

 tinction is the simple consideration, whether the society in question has an 

 independent existence, or exists simply as a part of some other society or 

 State. This question, though in some cases difficult, is, in general, easily 

 to be determined. 



I define a State, therefore, simply as an autonomous society of men. 

 By "autonomous," I do not mean complete and absolute independence 

 of external control, but simply such degree of independence as is incon- 

 sistent with the notion of the society referred to being an integral part of 

 another State. And it may be added that by the term " society " a cer- 

 tain degree or kind of permanence is necessarily implied. For the term 

 itself, according to its etymology, and also according to its habitual use, 

 denotes an aggregation of companions or habitual associates. 



In this definition, we have omitted an element almost universal, 

 namely, the permanent occupation of a common territory. This, how- 

 ever, cannot be regarded as an essential element of the notion of the 

 State ; which may be conceived, and has in fact existed in a migratory 

 condition, as for instance, the Israelites in their wanderings, and the Ger- 

 man tribes prior to their settlement. Indeed, in the history of the race 

 the first principle of association is that of kinship, and it is by this prin- 

 ciple that the State is first recognized and determined ; the influence of 

 the common territory in determining the State is of later origin. But 

 such a condition can exist only in primitive times, and we may, there- 

 fore, without error, leave it out of view and regard the permanent occu- 

 pation of a common territory as an element in the definition. In other 

 words, in our investigations, we may confine our consideration to the sub- 

 ject of territorial States. 



A still more important omission from the definition seems to be that 

 the element of government is apparently omitted. History nowhere pre- 

 sents us with a society of men absolutely without government or politi- 

 cal organization, and we might, therefore, confining ourselves entirely to 

 the facts historically known to us, include this element in our definition. 

 But this would be to violate the rule that the definition of a term should 

 contain no more elements than are necessary to define the class denoted ; 

 as, for instance, as if we should define a triangle as a three-sided figure 

 having three angles. The State being thus defined, it may be conclu- 

 sively inferred from the nature of men, as known to us in history, and 

 otherwise from experience, that in every State the fact of government 

 must, so far as our experience goes, also exist. But it is possible that in 

 prehistoric times men existed without government, and that, in some 

 higher state of human development in the future, government may be- 



