234: 



overmaster his regard to the well-being, and even to the rights of others. 

 Thus, in the absence of restraint, he is, by his own evil desires, and from 

 the fear of like treatment from others, almost irresistibly impelled to 

 invade and attack his neighbors, and by means of force or fraud to sub- 

 ject them to his own power, or, in the expressive language of the law, to 

 convert Iheni and Iheir property to his own use. Hence results the neces- 

 sity of government ; without which there would necessarily exist a uni- 

 versal and continuous conflict between men, which it would be no exag- 

 geration to call, with Hobbes, a condition of permanent war of "every 

 man against every man."* Hence, we may conclude with him, that " the 

 final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally love liberty (in them- 

 selves), and dominion over others, in the introduction of that restraint 

 upon themselves in which we see them live in commonwealths, is the 

 foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; 

 that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of 

 war which is necessarily consequent to the natural passions of men when 

 there is no visible power to keep them in awe."f 



But in agreeing with Hobbes on this point, it is not necessary for us to 

 accept also his psychological theory (in which he is followed b}' Bentham 

 and Austin), that men act always from selfish motives, and are incapable 

 of any other. The sentiments of benevolence and justice, though less 

 strong, are as really principles of human nature as is regard to one's own 

 interest. In this respect, the views of Mr. 'Calhoun are more just, 3'et 

 equally sufficient to establish the conclusion reached. The question and 

 the solution of it is thus slated by him : 



" What is that constitution of our nature, which, while it impels man to 

 associate with his kind, renders it impossible for society to exist without 

 government? 



" The answer will be found in the fact that, while man is created for the 

 social State, and is accordingly so formed as to feel what afi'ects others, as 

 well as what affects himself, he is, at the same time, so constituted as to 

 feel more intensely what affects him directly, than what affects him indi- 

 rectly through others ; or, to express it differently, he is so constituted, 

 that his direct or individual affections are stronger than his sympathetic 

 or social affections. I intentionally avoid the expression, selfish feelings, 

 as applicable to the former, because, as commonly used, it implies an un. 

 usual excess of the individual over the social feelings, in the person to 

 whom it is applied, and consequently something depraved and vicious. 



"But that constitution of our nature which makes us feel more in. 

 tensely what affects us directly than what affects us indirectly through 

 others, necessarily leads to conflict between individuals. Each, in conse- 

 quence, has a greater regard for his own safety or happiness, than for the 

 safety or happiness of others, and, where these come in opposition, is ready 

 to sacrifice the interests of others to his own. And hence the tendency to 

 a universal state of conflict between individual and individual ; accompa- 



* Lev., Chap. xiii. i Id., Chap, xviii. 



