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least, not to imagine we recognize, in this "our artificial man" — as 

 Hobbes calls him — the familiar lineaments and qualiiies of an actual man, 

 or to refrain from thinking and speaking of him accordingly. And to 

 this usage, properly guarded, no objection can be made. For so numer- 

 ous and striking are the resemblances, or rather the analogies, between 

 the State and the individual man, that the most convenient, and there- 

 fore the most natural, way of describing the qualities and actions of the 

 former, is to apply to them the terms we use with reference to the latter. 

 Accordingly this has become the settled upage of our own and other lan- 

 guages, from which, even were it otherwise d'jsirable, it is now too late 

 to depart. 



This usage is indeed in some respects extremely misleading and danger- 

 ous ; but the same is true of language generallj^ ; throughout which the 

 same method of expressing mental conceptions by terms originally appro- 

 priate only to physical objects universally prevails ; and hence, out of 

 such analogies, arises the wonderful power of fallacy — or, to be more 

 accurate, the vion(\iiri\i\ fallacy -producing power — contained in words — a 

 power unsuspected by the multitude, but recognized by all profound 

 thinkers, and practically illustrated in the most conspicuous and stiikhig 

 manner, by the justly distinguished writers we have reviewed ; and which 

 we will, again and again, have occasion to observe in the further progress 

 of our inquiries. But fortunately, against this power, it is practicable 

 for us effectively to guard ourselves by simply observing, and always 

 bearing in mind, where we use a word in a transferred sense, that it is 

 with an essentially different meaning from that originally denoted ; and 

 that the resemblance between the conceptions denoted respectively by 

 the secondary and the original senses of the term is not a resemblance of 

 essential nature, but a mere analogy ; which may be useful in suggesting, 

 but is incapable of accurately expressing the conception denoted by 

 the former. 



Hence we may, without impropriety, and, bearing in mind the above 

 caution, without danger, apply this usage to the State, and speak of "its 

 will," or "its conscience," as though it were a man ; and, indeed, in the 

 present state of language, it is difficult otherwise to express ourselves. 

 But in fact these expressions, taken literally, and all theories founded on 

 their literal sense, are without signification, or, in other words, non- 

 sensical. For both terms, and other terms expressing human qualities, 

 are strictly relative, and imply, as a correlative, an actual human being 

 in whom to exist. 



The two expressions commented upon — "the will of the State," 

 and "the conscience of the State" — when rightly understood, are 

 equally innocent, but it cannot be said that, in their actual influ- 

 ence on political science, they have been equally innocuous. By the 

 former is meant nothing more than the concurring wills of the indi- 

 viduals, or of some of the individuals who possess the political power ; 

 but it has been commonly understood in its literal sense, or non-sense, 



