242 



existing in the nature of man, inevitably driving him into society, or by force or 

 violence, exercised by men at least with the predominant motive of advancing their ov?n 

 interests. 



Again, the definition of Cicero {Republic, Bk. i, Sec. 25) is also objectionable: "The 

 State {respublica) is the collection of a multitude associated by a common sense of right and 

 a community of inierei-ts." 



A common sense of right and a community of interests generally result from the 

 establishment of a State ; but even if this proposition were universally true, it would not 

 be appropriate to tlae definition. And, indeed, a State may exist with little or no " com- 

 mon sense of right," or "community of interests," as for instance, the great Asiatic 

 despotisms, and perhaps many European empires. 



The definition of Aristotle, who defines a State or city to be "a certain number of 

 citizens " {Politics, Bk ii. Chap, i), and that of Austin wlio defines it " as an independent 

 political society " (Jicr., p. 219), are both free from objection, at least in this respect. 



(rf) " In American Constitutional Law, there is a division of the powers of sovereignty 

 between the national and State governments by subjects ; the former being possessed of 

 supreme, absolute and uncontrollable power over certain subjects throughout all the 

 States and Territories, while the latter have the like complete power, within their respec- 

 tive territorial limits, over other subjects." — Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 2. 



" In the case now to be determined, the defendant (in error), a sovereign State, denies 



the obligation of a law enacted by the Legislature of the Union (p. 400) Thegov- 



ernmeut of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action 



(405) (Bat) Should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass 



laws for tlie accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government, it would become 

 the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, 

 to say such an act was not the law of the land (425) 



" The sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists by its own authority, 

 or is introduced by its permission ; but does it extend to those means which are employed 

 by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred upon that body by the people of 

 the United States? We think it demonstrably does not" (429,.— Marshall, C. J., 4 Wheat., 

 400. 



" The federal government is supreme within the scope of its delegated powers, and the 

 State governments are equally supreme in the exercise of those powers not delegated by 

 them nor inhibited to them. From this it is clear, that, while these supreme functions 

 are exercised by the federal and State governments, within their respective limitations, 

 they can never come in conflict, and when a conflict occurs, the inquiry must necessa- 

 rily be, which is the paramount law? And that must depend upon the supremacy of 

 the power by which it was enacted. The federal government is supreme in the exercise 

 of powers delegated to it. but beyond this its acts are unconstitutional and void. So the 

 acts of the States are void when they do that which is inhibited to them, or exercise a 

 power which they have exclusively delegated to the federal government." — License 

 Cases, 5 Howard, 588. 



"Although the State of Wisconsin is sovereign within its territorial limits to a certain 

 extent, yet that sovereignty is limited and restricted by the Constitution of the United 

 States, and the powers of tlie general government, and of the State, although both exist 

 and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sover- 

 eignties, acting separately and independe-itly of each other, within their respective 

 spheres."— Ableraan vs. Booth, 21 How., 516. 



(e) This is well explained by Mr. Ahrens : 



" Before him (Aristotle) Plato seized still more profoundly the intimate relation 

 between the man and the State, when he conceived the order of right, as above all, an 

 order which each man ought first to realize in his own internal nature, of which society 

 is always more or less a reflection. For this reason Plato saw in each man a State in 

 miniature ('micropolis '), as he saw in society man enlarged ('writ large'). The same 



opinion is professed by Krause The State, without doubt, .... must always be, 



in its organization, and in the forces and modes of its activity, the mirror of the interior 



