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thing more to do than this ii e , to maintain justice), it is clear that it has 

 to do this. And by implication, it is clear that it is not permissible to do 

 anything which hinders the doing of this." This, it will be observed, is, 

 so far, a precise statement of what we have called the juristic doctrine. 



"Hence, the question of limits becomes the question whether, beyond 

 maintaining justice, the State can do anything else without transgressing 

 justice. On consideration, we shall find that it cannot."* 



Three arguments are urged in support of this position, which are drawn 

 (1) from the nature of the State,f (2) from the imperfection of political 

 instrumenialities, :]: and (3) from the demoralizing influence of govern- 

 mental interference on private character^ 



With the last two arguments, so far as they go, I entirely concur. 

 Thus, with regard to the last, it cannot be doubted that the progress of 

 individuals and of society is, in the main, the product of individual energy 

 and voluntary cooperation, and that these forces operate most efHciently 

 in a state of liberty ; nor can it be doubled that the virtues, intellectual 

 and moral, by which this progress is eflFected, must necessarily be more or 

 less deteriorated by the assumption of unnecessary functions by the gov- 

 ernment, and the consequent disuse of such functions, by individuals 

 and voluntary associations. And this is especially manifest with regard 

 to the capacity for private cooperation ; which, in the view of the most 

 sober and profound thinkers, must constitute the principal instrumentality 

 in the development of civilization ; and which, it is not extravagant to 

 hope, may, in the end, take the place of government in the performance 

 of all but its absolutely essential functions. 



With regard to the second argument— namely, the argument from the 

 imperfection ot political instrumentality— the reasoning is even more con- 

 clusive ; for, whatever view we may take of the extent of the functions 

 of government, it is obvious that we must always consider, not only the 

 legitimacy of the end, but also the efficiency of the means by which it is 

 to be attained ; and, hence, that no functions should be undertaken, except 

 those absolutely essential, until an efficient instrumentality for its per- 

 formance can be obtained. Nor is there any proposition more entirely 

 demonstrated by liistorical experience than that the political agencies 

 with which we have hitherto had to deal are utterly and entirely incom- 

 petent for the purpose, on account of the dishonesty, and, still more, the 

 ignorance, of government officials. It is also, as we have observed, a 

 fact of fundamental importance that the only efficient means we have of 

 directing and controlling the government is public opinion, and especially 

 that form of it whicli constitutes the positive morality of the commu- 

 nity. Hence, it is evident, the only hope of an improvement in political 

 organization, and in the cliaracter of political rulers, lies in an enlightened 

 public opinion. But this, at the present time, and not less in this coun- 

 try than in others, is, with regard to political matters, lacking, in the 

 highest degree, both in honesty and in knowledge. We need, therefore, 



* Justice, t Id., Sec. 121. J Id., Sec. 123, et seq. § Id., Sec. 135, et scq. 



