248 



as an essential condition to the enlargement of the functions of govern- 

 ment, a cultivation of political science in all its departments ; and until 

 this takes place, and public opinion is thereby enlightened and by this, 

 or otlier means, an improved political organization, and a moderate degree 

 of honesty and intelligence in our public officials obtained, all thought of 

 governmental interference, beyond cases of the strictest necessity, should 

 be abandoned. 



Hitherto, nearly all the interferences of government with individual 

 action, beyond what were essentially necessary, have been, if not in their 

 end, at least in their execution, altogether unjustifiable, and such inter- 

 ferences have been, and are the source of more human misery and un- 

 happiness than almost any other cause. So that, in fact, instead of regard- 

 ing the present condition of things as being the result of a hmsez faire 

 policy — as is commonly asserted by those who favor an extension of the 

 functions of the State — the opposite is true, and it must be regarded 

 largely as the result of such undue interferences by the government. The 

 advocates of the laissez faire doctrine may, therefore, justly claim that 

 before any argument against it can be drawn from experience, we must 

 first give the policy a fair trial by divesting the government of unneces- 

 sary functions ; and, undeT this view of the matter, those who are 

 opposed to governmental action beyond the demands of necessity may, 

 without shame, accept the name applied to them by Huxley, and, with 

 Prof. Sumner, regard themselves, to this extent, as Niliilists. (c) 



But just here, a great and almost insurmountable difficulty presents 

 itself ; the existence of which constitutes one of the most serious argu- 

 ments against undue governmental interference. For it is a fact, as un- 

 doubted as it is unfortunate, that whenever a policy is once adopted, how- 

 ever unjust and detrimental to the public interests it may be, it generates 

 immediately a host of private interests, by which it is so buttressed and 

 defended as, in general, to make it almost impregnable. Of tliis, a thou- 

 sand illustrations might be given, but, as in every case there has been de- 

 veloped a strong and interested public opinion, the illustrations would 

 simply have the effect of prejudicing the minds of many readers against 

 the principle itself, and will, tlierefore, be dispensed with. The reader 

 may, however, readily find sufficient illustration in the opinions of his 

 political opponents. 



The doctrine of laissez faire must, therefore, I think, with reference to 

 the existing state of things, be regarded as practically established ; and to 

 those who would deny it, we may say, with Oxenstiern : " Nescis, mi 

 fili, quam parva sapientia regitur mundus." (d) 



But while this doctrine, as a practical maxim, is, for the present, to be 

 accepted, this cannot be said of it as a universal theory, true of the future, 

 as of the past. Nor is the argument of Mr. Spencer on this point at all 

 conclusive. His conclusion, as we have seen, is lliat the Stale cannot do 

 anything beyond maintaining justice, "without transgressing justice ;" 

 and the argument is, that, in going beyond its function of maintaining 



