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■with their professional brethren and the judges ; but, unquestionably, the 

 interests, not only of litigants, but of society generally, are injuriously 

 affected by the lack of such education. So that, with regard to the for- 

 mer, it may not be extravagant to say that the license of the average law- 

 yer is to be likened, as it were, to a letter of mark, authorizing him to prey 

 upon mankind. And with regard to society, it cannot be doubted that 

 the efficient administration of justice, for which thoroughly educated 

 jurists are required, is essential to the preservation of the positive moral- 

 ity of the people, which is in fact the life of civilization ; and that the in- 

 efficient performance of the judicial functions is of all other causes of 

 demoralization the strongest and most irresistible. 



On the same grounds, also, it is evident that it is a legitimate function 

 of the government to encourage education in political science ; for this 

 branch of literature is so unremunerative, that, without such encourage- 

 ment, it must continue to be, as it has been, neglected. So, too, with 

 regard to citizens generally, it is necessary and therefore legitimate for 

 the government, by the judicious supervision of education, and, when 

 necessary, by affirmative help, to provide lor their education in such 

 points as may be necessary to fit them for their political functions ; 

 and this includes, undoubtedly, as an essential condition, instruction at 

 least in the primary branches of education. But beyond this, and per- 

 haps some similar cases that I have overlooked, no satisfactory grounds 

 can be assigned for the further extension of the functions of the govern- 

 ment in this direction ; and it is therefore difficult to conceive of any 

 principle upon which to justify the American theory of public education, 

 which aims to absorb the whole of education, and whose object is con- 

 ceived to be the good of the individual student. 



The same considerations apply to the encouragement of literature ; 

 whicii it is the legitimate function of the State to encourage so far as 

 necessity may demand ; as is the case with reference to political and 

 moral science, and also philosophy generally. For in this branch of lit- 

 erature, even if we may count upon a few high spirits, who, at the sacri- 

 fice of their worldly interests, may devote themselves to it, we cannot 

 count upon theii finding readers, or sufficient remuneration for their ser- 

 vices to keep them alive. But this object is not at all effected by the 

 copyright laws, whose effect is rather to submerge the productions of 

 solid thought under a flood of shallow and unprofitable matter, which, 

 in the mass, cannot be said to conduce in any way to the welfare of so- 

 ciety. Iq this, I am no doubt singular ; for even Mr. Spencer, and other 

 administrative nihilists, justify this policy, not, indeed, on the ground of 

 its being conducive to the interests of society, but on the principle of the 

 author's supposed right of property in his work — a principle which, it 

 seems to me, is altogether without justification. For the supposed right, 

 as has been uniformly held by our courts, has no analogy whatever to the 

 right of property, and cannot be regarded in any other light than that 

 of a mere monopoly. 



