260 



with the end of the social orcier in general, or, as I would say, which confounds the end 

 of the government with that of the State. 



The second category comprehends the several theories, which assign to the State one, 

 or several, particular ends. This class includes numerous and inconsistent theories, as, 

 for instance, that of Aristotle, who, with Cicero and Grotius, distinguished " a direct 

 end of the State, consisting in the maintenance of justice, and an indirect end, consisting 

 in happiness or well-being;" it includes also the theory of Thomasius and Kant, who 

 make a radical distinction between Right and Morality, and assign the first as the sole 

 eud of the State— holding that the State should not otherwise concern itself with the 

 happiness of its members, but should leave it to the free choice of each to seek his own 

 happiness ; and also, the doctrine of Leibnitz, who regards the end of the State to be the 

 perfectioiimenl of society, and that of Wolf, who regards it as happiness or felicity, or the 

 common welfare and safety ; and finally also that of Hegel, which may be regarded " as 

 the culminating point of the modern movement which commences by presenting the 

 State as the pivot of social order, and ends, not only by absorbing, in the ancient way, 

 everything in it, but also, by conceiving the State itself as the absolute end, as the mani- 

 festation of the Divinity, or, as the ' present God' " (or, as Hobbes says, "the Mortal 

 God "), an apotheosis by which the just relations of the State, as a means, with the culture 

 of all that is diviue and humin, are completely inverted. 



" The third category consists of the doctrines which seek the orgmiic, and harmonic 

 relations of the State (i. e., the government), and its end, with the order, and the end of 

 human society. Apart from certain feeble essays attempted by others, there is only the 

 doctrine of Krause by which these organic relations can receive a precise definition in 

 conformity with all the tendencies, at once, of liberty aud of humanity, in our epoch " 

 {Cours cle Droit. Naturel, g 106, Du But, De I'Etat). 



This doctrine forms the basis of Mr. Ahren's own exposition ; which is set forth in the 

 following section (Du But, De i'E'nt on Point de Vue Ideah, and more generally in the first 

 part of the work in § 5, and which will be again reverted to. 



(g) The views in the text seem to agree, at least in the conclusion reached, with those 

 of Mr. Ahrens : 



" When we speak of right," he says, " as the fundamental end of the State, and thus 

 concede the State as b2ing by its essence I'etat de droit {rechts-stajt), we must remember 

 that right has not its ultimate end in itself, but in human culture ; it follows, then, that 

 we must assign to the State a double end ; an immediate, direct eud, that of right, and 

 an end indirect, but final, consisting in the social culture. This distinction is explained 

 by several authors, bat none of them, with the exc -ption of Krause, has made clear the 

 intimate and necessary relation existiug between right as the direct end, and all culture 

 as the final end." 



But the author explains, at length, that this function consists " in regulating or order- 

 ing the relations of life and of culture, without intervening in the causes and productive 

 forces which are situ ited outside of its domain and its action;" and "in realizing, for 

 all the spheres of life, the conditions of their existence and their development," " Intel- 

 lectual, moral, religious, economical causes," he says, "are the primary powers, the 

 immediate sources of life, and the powers of the State can consist only iu keeping open 

 the sources of life, from which flow, by the free and proper impulsion of all the forces, 

 individual and social, the good influences which form the ever increasing aliment of 

 social life " (C'ours de Droit Naturel, pp. 331, et seq.). 



I am unacquainted with Krause's views, with which Mr. Ahrens expresses hisagreement, 

 except at second hand. As well as I can make out, his theory seems to be, that the end 

 of government is simply the maintenance of right or justice, but the sentiment of right 

 is regarded by him, "not as a sentiment of individuality," but as "the sentiment of a 

 common and reciprocal relation " which demands " that all men should give and 

 receive mutually every condition for the fulfillment of their destiny, individual aud 

 aggregate" {Ideal de la Iliimaaidad, Sac. 17). The diffrirence between this, aud the nar- 

 rower view of justice, may be illustrated by the two forms of the familiar maxim, viz. : 

 " Do unto others what you would have others do to you ;" and : " Do not to others what 

 you would not have others do to you." 



