CHAPTER IV. 



Op the Nature and Method of Jurisprudence. 



1 38. Public Rigid a Branch of Jurisprudence or the Science of Rights. 



The subject of the rights of the State, or public right, does not ia 

 itself constitute a complete and independent subject of investigation, 

 but merely a division or part of a more general subject, namely, the 

 science of rights or justice, or, as it is more commonly called in our lan- 

 guage, Right, and in other languages, Recht, Droit, Diriito, Derecho, etc. 

 Some observations on this subject will therefore be required before enter- 

 ing upon the immediate subject of our investigations, which is, the rights 

 of the State. These will be found in this and the following chapter. 



The term, Right, like its foreign equivalents, denotes rather the sub- 

 ject of the science — i. e., rights in the aggregate — than the science 

 itself, and its use in the sense above given is, therefore, to some extent 

 inaccurate. On this account it is desirable to use some other term that, 

 like the German Rechtslere, may more accurately denote the science 

 itself ; and for this purpose no other can be suggested than the term, 

 Jurisprudence, which — though of late years it has, in our language, 

 drifted somewhat from its meaning — is now generally thus used in 

 other languages and not uncommonly in our own. 



Etymologically the term Jurisprudence denotes merely the science or 

 doctrine of 7«s/ but the latter term — like its equivalents, rigid, recht, 

 droit, diritto, derecho, etc. — is commonly used to denote not only theo- 

 retical right, but also positive right, or right actually realized in the 

 State by means of the law ; and the term Jurisprudence necessarily 

 presents a corresponding ambiguity. The latter use of the term is, 

 indeed, in our language, the most common ; and hence with us the 

 term Jurisprudence is generally regarded as belonging exclusively to 

 positive right, or, as we call it, the law ; and its application to theoret- 

 ical right seems to carry with it some appearance of impropriety. On 

 this account it has become a common usage to distinguish theoretical 

 from positive jurisprudence by calling the former natural jurispru- 

 dence ; and to this usage, where necessary to avoid confusion, no 

 objection can be" made. But in this work, unless the contrary is ex- 

 pressed, we uniformly use the term in the sense of theoretical or nat- 

 ural jurisprudence. 



§ 39. Division of Jurisprudence or Right. 



The term Right, as we have observed, is but an expression for rights 

 in the aggregate, and it may relate either to private or individual rights 



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