277 



moralist, whose task is to determiue, not the abstract nature of the 

 quality of rightness, but its presence or absence in given cases. Hence 

 the question of the absti'act nature of the distinction between right and 

 -.vrong belongs rather to the Metaphysics of Morality than to Moralitj^ 

 itself, which is concerned only with a practical question of deter- 

 mining as to the rectitude of human conduct. To assert that the 

 solution of this question must abide the solution of the metaphys- 

 ical problem — hitherto unsolved, and of which, as of other meta- 

 physical questions, there appears no promise of a solution — would 

 be in effect to assert in the face of history that man is incapable of 

 moral development, and, consequently, of civilization. But, on the 

 contrary, it is manifest that the metaphysical problem was itself sug- 

 gested by the previously existing moral judgments of mankind, and 

 could not present itself as a distinct subject of inquiry until Morality 

 had already been highly developed. Similarly, men reason without 

 understanding logic, and logic itself must be developed before the met- 

 aphj'sical question as to the ultimate grounds of human knowledge can 

 arise. But, as Locke says, "God did not make man a mere two-legged 

 animal and leave it to Aristotle to make him a reasonable creature." 

 And with like reason it may be said that fortunately it has not been 

 left to the metaphysicians to make him a moral being. 



There is also another interesting problem that seems to touch upon 

 the subject of our investigations, namely, the psychological problem as 

 to the faculty or faculties by which moral obligations and the necessity 

 of observing them are perceived. But this, also — though more suscep- 

 tible of solution than the metaphysical problem — does not fall within 

 the scope of our inquiry, but belongs rather to the Philosophy of Moral- 

 ity than to Morality itself. For our task is to determine neither the 

 abstract nature of the quality of rightness, nor the nature of the fac- 

 ulty by which we perceive the obligation to conform to it, but merely 

 the rectitude of this or that course of human conduct ; and in this 

 investigation it is manifestly indifferent what metaphysical or psj^cho- 

 logical theory we adopt, provided only it assert the reality of moral 

 distinctions and the possibilitj^ of perceiving them. 



It will be sufficient, therefore, to say that we use the terms, right and 

 wrong, in their ordinary and familiar acceptation, as denoting a uni- 

 versal and apparently necessary conception of the human conscious- 

 ness, and that the reader is at liberty to adopt a more specific definition, 

 according to the theory to which he may incline — as, for instance, that 

 it consists in conformity to the will of God, or to nature, or to the uni- 

 versal order, or to the end or destiny of man, or to general utility, or 

 the welfare of mankind. 



The above considerations, though sufficiently obvious, have not gen- 

 erally been observed ; and through this neglect have resulted the most 

 deleterious consequences to Jurisprudence and to Morality generally. 

 For to inquirers on these subjects almost the first questions that present 



PRCC AMER. PHILOS. SOC. XXXIV. 118. 2 J. PRINTED OCT. 30, 1895. 



